On State Monopoly Capitalism

This is the second part of a lecture I am preparing on why foreigners are still unable to understand a socialist market economy. This part examines state monopoly capitalism, which was a significant part of Soviet and European Marxist debates up to the end of the 1980. The text is as follows:

State monopoly capitalism is first and foremost a Marxist category, arising in Soviet thought (abbreviated as stamocap) and gaining widespread usage after the Second World War. Notably, in this tradition ‘state monopoly capitalism’ is used almost exclusively to speak of capitalist countries in light of the evolving stages of capitalism. With one exception: I have been able to find one example – an implicit one – where a certain type of state monopoly capitalism has been used more recently in relation to socialist countries (among others). I will deal with this exception towards the end.

State monopoly capitalism may be defined as a ‘distinct stage of capitalism characterised by the fusion of monopoly forces with the bourgeois state to form a single mechanism of economic exploitation and political domination’ (Jessop 1982, 32).[1] I have taken this definition from Bob Jessop, who provides what is arguably the most comprehensive critical overview of the theory. The date of publication is also telling, for in 1982 the theory was still relatively widespread. There were two main components: a new stage of capitalism in light of its internal crises, which entailed a closer alignment of monopoly capital and the bourgeois state; a development of communist strategy to exploit the contradictions through popular front activities.

The theory initially arose in the Soviet Union (Varga 1964, 1964 [1968], 1934) and became dominant from the 1950s to the 1980s, so much so that The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia has a major 1979 entry (Cheprakov 1979). The origins may be traced back to Marx and Engels, concerning the contradiction between competition and monopoly, and Lenin’s relatively undeveloped observation that imperialism entails the growth of state monopolies (Lenin 1916 [1964], 1917 [1964]-b),[2] so much so that – and here he quotes a resolution – ‘monopoly capitalism is developing into state monopoly capitalism’ (Lenin 1917 [1964]-a, 305; 1917 [1969]-b, 443).[3]

During its heyday, the theory of state monopoly capitalism developed in a number of directions, depending on the emphasis and context. Jessop identifies four, with copious references:

1) General crisis approach, in which the capitalist world faced yet another stage of crisis, generated by the increasing number of socialist countries, the collapse of European colonialism in light of anti-colonial liberation struggles. The response of a decaying capitalism was to find new domination through the merging of the state and monopoly capitalism.

2) Monopoly-theoretical tradition (strong in the Soviet Union and Germany), in which the contradiction of competition and monopoly leads to a permanent domination of the latter. This was seen as a new stage of capitalism, beyond imperialism – as Lenin had initially argued (Lenin 1916 [1964], 1916 [1969]). Here too we find the challenge of socialism, but now seen primarily in class terms: the international challenge of socialism leads to the fusion of monopolies and state, with resultant militarism and a focus on technological development.

3) The capital-theoretical tradition (England, but also in Germany and the Soviet Union), which focuses on the basic laws of capitalist motion. This approach emphasises that state monopoly capitalism is a crisis-driven response to the contradiction between the increasing socialisation of the forces of production and private nature of the relations of production. The state’s active role at multiple levels effectively further socialises the relations of production through the state. On the British side (Fine and Harris 1979, 120-45), this entails not a new stage of imperialism (see above), but a third stage in the capitalist mode of production, after laissez-faire and monopoly capitalism. The state’s active role – through nationalisation, taxation, and state credit – not only negates working class access to real state power through direct control, but also internationalises productive capital by working with multi-national companies and establishing international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

4) The French ‘overaccumulation’ approach, which was framed in terms of the contradiction between private monopoly capital’s overaccumulation and its revalorisation through the state. Basing its approach on the cyclical crises of capitalism, which at times reach a crescendo so that structural changes are needed, the French approach identified the increasing role of the state in ensuring that the falling rate of profit (which leads to overaccumulation) is arrested for a time by comprehensive structural changes. Thus, state monopoly capitalism becomes a necessary development to ensure, through the state’s central role, that private monopoly capital is able to produce surplus-value. And it does so through reorganising the relations of production, with the resultant increase in exploitation and polarisation of classes.

To sum up, most approaches agreed on a few basics: state monopoly capitalism was a new stage, either beyond imperialism or a third stage in capitalism (after laissez-faire and simple monopoly); this new stage was yet another systemic effort to deal with unsolvable contradictions, whether in terms of the relations of production and globalised class conflict or in terms of the means of production; it entailed new types of exploitation for workers and efforts to suppress of socialism. But they also differed in many ways, with a core difference determined by whether the focus was primarily political or economic. Thus, those who saw the development in political terms (monopoly-theoretical) were keen to find new approaches to political agitation, but they ran the risk of determining the economic analysis through such an agenda. By contrast, those who preferred to focus on the internal laws of capitalism (capital-theoretical and overaccumulation approaches) at times seemed to come close to Marxist ‘book worship’ and thus a type of economism.

I would like to close with two final questions. First, are there any abiding insights from this material? At a deeper level, it was very useful in identifying the inescapable role of the bourgeois state within a capitalist economy. Debates may continue as to the changing ways this happens, but it is a useful corrective to the neo-classical (and indeed neoliberal) approach which sees the market as a separate entity, within which the state intervenes from time to time.[4] One way of seeing the tensions within capitalist economics is in light of these two theoretical approaches: while the state is deeply and structurally involved, there are at the same time constant moves to delink the state, to privatise state assets and seek a ‘small state’. Periodically – such as during wartime or extensive economic crises – one approach dominates, but then we find a reactive move in the other direction.

This point brings me to the second question: why did state monopoly capitalism as a theory virtually disappear among foreign Marxists after 1989 and the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe? One reason is that it was due to the tensions within capitalism outlined above: the drive to state monopoly capitalism produced a reaction in the 1980s, with the revival of laissez-faire economics under the label of ‘neoliberalism’. Another reason is that many of the theorists saw a major contradiction at a global level between capitalism and socialism. The latter was growing at the time, with successful revolutions in Asia, anti-colonial struggles and national liberation in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, while the capitalist world was shrinking. The counter-revolution in Eastern Europe seemed to suggest that this analysis was wrong. Instead, socialism seemed to be in retreat and capitalism was gaining momentum.

Or that is how it seemed to Western eyes in the 1990s and early 2000s. Since then, of course, much has changed. Socialist countries, especially China, are now more powerful and influential than they have been for a very long time. Many formerly colonised countries have found that the economic models borrowed from the West have not worked and they are looking for alternative models adapted to their own conditions. And these countries have also been active in international bodies, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organisation, transforming them from within to suit the conditions of a rapidly changing world.

Indeed, I suspect that ‘state monopoly capitalism’ may make a comeback as a category of analysis, albeit in a different way. Thus far, state monopoly capitalism has not been applied to socialist countries,[5] but there is a beginning of efforts to do so, albeit without any awareness of the Marxist origins and development of the term. Let me give one example, although it is implicit rather than explicit. It appears in the recent work by the neo-classical economist, Kurlantzick, who works within the framework of state capitalism but seeks to delimit its application. Realising that ‘state capitalism’ potentially applies to all states, he offers this definition: ‘countries whose government has an ownership stake in or significant influence over more than one-third of the five hundred largest companies, by revenue, in that country, a situation that gives these governments far greater control over the corporate sector than a government in a more free-market oriented nation like the United States or the United Kingdom’ (Kurlantzick 2016, 9). This definition is extremely intriguing, for Kurlantzick must work very hard to exclude a number of countries – such as France, Japan and the United States – from his list. In order to so, he adds:

  1. The ownership and control of key enterprises must be direct and not indirect (since the United States provides massive indirect subsidies to its military and automobile industries)
  2. This ownership and control must be long-term and not during economic crises, as we found after 2008 in some countries.
  3. Direct government spending on items such as welfare is also excluded.
  4. Sovereign wealth funds are excluded.

Only in this way can he focus on what are implicitly seen as state-monopoly capitalist countries. A major reason for the restrictions is that Kurlantzick is desperate to save mostly Western countries from being versions of state (monopoly) capitalism, for he sees their ‘free market’ approach and its attendant liberalism as under severe threat and failing. But even with these restrictions, the number of state monopoly capitalist countries is quite large, as the following table indicates (Kurlantzick 2016, 28):

More monopolised                    Hybrid           Less monopolised

Two socialist countries make the list, China and Vietnam, although they are by no means the most ‘monopolised’ according to Kurlantzick’s criteria. The question arises as to why this implicit state monopoly capitalism should be recurring now, albeit without awareness of the Marxist tradition. Has the effort to revive laissez-faire economics under the label of ‘neoliberalism’ run its course? I will say more on this question in the section on state capitalism.

Bibliography

Bollana, Primo. 1981. ‘Some Characteristics of State Monopoly Capitalism in the Soviet Union’. In Soviet Revisionism and the Struggle of the PLA to Unmask It, edited by Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA. Tirana: “8 Nëntori” Publishing House.

Cheprakov, V.A. 1979. ‘Gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskiĭ kapitalizm’. In Bolʹshaia sovetskaia ėntsiklopediia. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia.

Fine, Ben, and Laurence Harris. 1979. Rereading Capital. London: Macmillan.

Herzog, Phillippe. 1972. Politique économique et planification en regime capitaliste. Paris: Editions sociales.

Hoxha, Enver. 1978 [1985]. ‘Imperialism and the Revolution’. In Selected Works, 358-707. Tirana: “8 Nëntori” Publishing House.

Jessop, Bob. 1982. The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2016. State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transforming the World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lenin, V.I. 1916 [1964]. ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline’. In Collected Works, Vol. 22, 185-304. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

———. 1916 [1969]. ‘Imperializm, kak vysshaia stadiia kapitalizma (Populiarnyĭ ocherk)’. In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 27, 299-426. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury.

———. 1917 [1964]-a. ‘Speech in Favour of the Resolution on the Current Situation, April 29 (May 12), 1917’. In Collected Works, Vol. 24, 305-8. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

———. 1917 [1964]-b. ‘War and Revolution: A Lecture Delivered May 14 (27), 1917’. In Collected Works, Vol. 24, 398-421. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

———. 1917 [1965]. ‘The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It’. In Collected Works, Vol. 25, 323-69. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

———. 1917 [1969]-a. ‘Groziashchaia katastrofa i kak s nei borot’sia’. In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 34, 151-99. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury.

———. 1917 [1969]-b. ‘Rech’ v zashchitu rezoliutsiia o tekushchem momente, 29 aprelia (12 maia)’. In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 31, 443-46. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury.

———. 1917 [1969]-c. ‘Voina i revolutsiia: Lektsiia 14 (27) maia, 1917g’. In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 32, 77-102. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury.

Varga, Evgenii. 1934. The Great Crisis and its Political Consequences: Economics and Politics, 1928-1934. London: Modem Books.

———. 1964. Ocherki po problemam politékonomii kapitalizma. Moscow: Gospolitizdat.

———. 1964 [1968]. Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

[1] Compare the definition in The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia: ‘new, more developed form of monopoly capitalism, characterized by the joining of the forces of capitalist monopolies with the power of the state to preserve and strengthen the capitalist system, enrich the monopolies, suppress the workers’ and national liberation movements, and unleash aggressive wars’ (Cheprakov 1979).

[2] Lenin speaks of ‘the beginnings of state-controlled capitalist production, combining the colossal power of capitalism with the colossal power of the state into a single mechanism and bringing tens of millions of people within the single organisation of state capitalism’ (Lenin 1917 [1964]-b, 403; 1917 [1969]-c, 83). For a comprehensive assessment of Lenin’s contribution, see Jessop (1982, 32-36).

[3] Lenin is, however, not entirely consistent in his usage and the theory remains somewhat undeveloped. Before the October revolution, he saw state monopoly capitalism as a development, especially in the context of war, to a new level of capitalism itself, although even here it was already seen as a step towards socialism (Lenin 1917 [1965], 361-63; 1917 [1969]-a, 191-93). Later, he quotes from this 1917 text – ‘The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It’ – in ‘The Tax in Kind’ from 1921, where he argues for the need for a muted verison of state capitalism during the New Economic Policy. In other words, he subsumed state monopoly capitalism under state capitalism (see below), which he saw as a (major) step towards socialism. This inconsistency is most likely due to different circumstances: the initial proposal was made before the October Revolution during the last phase of Russia’s engagement in the First World War, while his later development of the idea took place after the revolution and Civil War, particularly in light of the need to develop the New Economic Policy.

[4] Indeed, one of the debates over state monopoly capitalism concerned the relation between state and economy: were they fused under state monopoly capitalism, distinct, or did they function in terms of ‘contradictory separation in unity’ (Herzog 1972, 125)

[5] One does find very occasional accusations internal to the former Eastern Bloc that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had descended, from the time of Khrushchev, to a type of state monopoly capitalism (Bollana 1981; Hoxha 1978 [1985], 414-15).

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Book outline: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

This book arises from a contradiction in our time: Chinese scholars and indeed most people in China are well aware of the key arguments and developments that form the basis of socialism with Chinese characteristics (zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi); non-Chinese scholars are largely ignorant, even though I find that more and more want to know at least something. In China, many of the topics presented in this book were settled quite a few years ago, so much so that one finds relatively little debate today. Other topics have a renewed vigour – such as contradiction analysis and rule of law – but these rely on earlier debates. By contrast, one struggles to find even remotely adequate treatment of these topics in foreign materials – if they are studied at all. I will examine some of the reasons in the introduction to the book, but three may be identified here: first, some have a tendency to say they prefer to look at the practice and ignore the theory, but this is a profound abdication of not only proper research, but Marxism itself (where theory along with practice is crucial); second, the material that does appear stops with the death of Mao Zedong (some, especially by Knick Knight, is excellent); third, the vast bulk of available scholarship is in Chinese. Obviously, one needs to be able to research this Chinese-language material.

Even so, the primary purpose of this book not to engage in polemics (lunzhan – fighting theories), but to make available for a non-Chinese audience the sophisticated debates and conclusions in China concerning socialism with Chinese characteristics. Without knowing this material, one can come to superficial perceptions and profound misunderstandings; knowing it, one begins the first steps in understanding and thereby trust. The following begins with a careful philosophical analysis of Deng Xiaoping, and the implications of his core ideas and practices. This study is the basis of what the rest of the book: contradiction analysis; the Marxist philosophy of the Reform and Opening Up; the basis and nature of the socialist market economy; socialist modernisation; rule of law; sovereignty and human rights; minority nationalities and the anti-colonial project; and Xi Jinping’s thorough Marxism in a Chinese situation. I should say that I have about a year of further in-depth research before me, so some of the material below will be revised as the project develops.

Introduction

The introduction begins by tracing the idea that while Marxism has core principles, or sets of problems, the way it develops in different locations has distinct characteristics. While there are global commonalities, each region has its distinct history, culture and philosophical tradition. As a result, in each situation the problems are somewhat unique and require new answers – hence the specific ‘characteristics’ of Marxism in such a location. We may trace this idea back to the late writings of Marx and Engels, as they faced developments of socialism in other parts of the world. But it begins to appear more clearly with Lenin and Stalin, and of course with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Obviously, the idea is not original to Deng, although he gave it a particular resonance in China.

The introduction also attempts to explain why there is precious little treatment in non-Chinese material of the Marxist basis of the Reform and Opening Up, with which ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has been most closely associated. In order to understand this situation, I elaborate on the distinction between ‘before’ and ‘after’ October. In other words, a crucial divide in analysis appears between those who take the perspective of ‘before October’, before the communist revolution, and those who analyse Marxism ‘after October’, after the revolution and in the difficult period of the construction of socialism. As Lenin and Mao said repeatedly, gaining power in a communist revolution is relatively easy; by contrast, constructing socialism is infinitely more complicated. Obviously, this study is concerned with ‘after October’, with the project of constructing socialism.

Finally, the introduction presents the main features of Chinese scholarship on socialism with Chinese characteristics. This material is immense, so I introduce the main resources, journals and themes – with a distinct focus on the philosophical foundations as they are manifested in practice.

Chapter 1. Reading Deng Xiaoping

‘Less talk, more deeds’ – Deng Xiaoping is mostly remembered as a leader of concrete acts rather than extensive theoretical reflection. In non-Chinese works, one may find biographies, studies of foreign policy, and scattered quotations taken out of context (albeit usually within a western European liberal framework). Few indeed are the studies of ‘Deng Xiaoping theory [lilun]’. Apart from Domenico Losurdo, no-one outside China has credited Deng with a sophisticated and insightful theoretical basis.

Through a careful study of Deng’s speeches and writings, along with relevant Chinese scholarship, I analyse the philosophical basis in two related ideas: liberating thought, and seeking truth from facts. While the terms seem simple enough on the surface, at a deeper level they identify the need to escape from the trap of Marxist dogmatism (as Mao also urged) and the need for careful analysis of the particular conditions of China in order to develop new answers in light of the Marxist tradition. From these two core ideas flow many of Deng’s positions: liberating the forces of production (see further the chapter on the socialist market economy), seeking a moderately well-off (xiaokang) society, to each according to work, and of course socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Chapter 2. Contradiction Analysis

Deng Xiaoping presented less of a break with Mao or indeed the Marxist tradition and more of a creative continuity within that living tradition. A significant element of this continuity was ‘contradiction analysis [maodun fenxi]’. This topic requires an initial step back to Mao Zedong (‘On Contradiction’) and how he developed a whole new phase in the Marxist tradition of dialectical analysis, via Lenin and Chinese conditions. Crucial for the construction of socialism is the idea of non-antagonistic contradictions: contradictions will appear under socialism, but the focus should be in ensuring they are non-antagonistic. Subsequently, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, we find contradiction analysis at the basis of philosophical thought and government policy. For example, it appears in: class analysis in the primary stage of socialism; socialist market economy; poverty alleviation; education: medicine; workplace realities; core socialist value; and – of course – the crucial need to identify a primary contradiction as the basis of all policy (as Xi Jinping did at the nineteenth congress of the CPC in 2018).

Chapter 3. The Marxist Basis of the Reform and Opening Up

It is perhaps less realised than it should be that the Reform and Opening Up is not a compromise, but a distinctly Marxist project. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out repeatedly, the Reform and Opening Up provides a distinct path to socialism (and not, as some misguided foreigners suggested, to capitalism). To understand this emphasis, we need initially to go back to Lenin and his insight into the relationship between revolution and reform. Instead of seeing these two terms as an either-or, Lenin argued that reform is absolutely necessary, but it should always be undertaken in light of the communist revolution. During the era of constructing socialism, this means that reform must be undertaken by a communist party in power. In a Chinese context, I would like to focus on the following issue (until more have been identified in research): the tension between equality-justice and improving the quality of life for all. In many respects, the Reform and Opening Up may be seen as an effort to keep the two sides of the contradiction in a productive and non-antagonistic relationship. Finally, this chapter offers a brief survey of the leading Marxist philosophers during the forty years of the Reform and Opening Up.

Chapter 4. Socialist Market Economy

With the socialist market economy, we come to a question that was settled in China 25 years ago, but of which foreigners remain noticeably ignorant. After immense debates in the 1980s and early 1990s, the following was seen as the solution. First and following Stalin, the core contradiction of socialism is between the forces and relations of production. How is this manifested? It can be – and often is – seen in terms of the ownership of the means of production. Thus, workers and peasants need to seize ownership of the means of production from the former bourgeois and landlord owners. But what happens after such a seizure and the destruction of the former ruling class? The contradiction shifts to one between the underlying socio-economic system (zhidu) and its specific components (tizhi). In the first category, we find – for example – a capitalist system and a socialist system; in the second, there are political, social and economic components. Here the productive forces also appear, of which one manifestation is a market economy. To summarise a more detailed analysis: a market economy may form part of a larger socio-economic system, including socialism; a market economy is not  always the same and is not inherently capitalist, but is shaped and determined by the system in question (as found already in Marx and in historical analysis); the overall system not only determines the nature of a market economy, but also its purpose, whether profit (capitalist system) or social benefit and meeting the needs of all people (gongtongti fuwu) as in a socialist system. Finally, this approach to a socialist market economy entails a recalibration of the question of ownership. Initially, the ownership of the means of production was related to secondary status, with a mix between public and private ownership, albeit with the state owned enterprises (SOEs) as the drivers of the economy. However, since the 2010s, one may identify a new development: the very distinction between public and private has begun to ‘die away’ (to parse Engels). How this works is the focus of the final part of the chapter.

Chapter 5. Socialist Modernisation: Seeking a Xiaokang Society

Since Zedong and Zhou Enlai, ‘socialist modernisation [shehuizhuyi xiandaihua]’ has been a major feature of government policy and action.[1] But what does it mean? Let us begin with Deng Xiaoping’s famous observation in 1979: ‘By achieving the four modernizations, we mean achieving a “moderately well-off family [xiaokang zhi jia]” … a moderately well-off country [xiaokang de guojia]’. For Deng, this is modernisation with Chinese characteristics.

To understand this statement, we need to go back and forward in the Chinese tradition. Deng was the first to pick and reinterpret the old Confucian category – from the Books of Rights and Book of Songs – of xiaokang in light of Marxism, with the sense of being moderately well-off, healthy and peaceful. It is a more achievable aim than datong, the ‘Great Harmony’, at least in the foreseeable future, although both terms (through He Xiu and Kang Youwei) are intimately connected. If we move forward in the more recent tradition, Deng’s insightful move led to a ‘moderately prosperous society in all respects’ becoming central to the Chinese socialist project under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and especially Xi Jinping. Indeed, the end of 2020 – following hints from Deng – was set as the ambitious but achievable goal for a xiaokang society. But what are the benchmarks? Xi Jinping has identified three: managing profound risks, poverty alleviation and environmental health. The last section of the chapter considers each of these items, with a focus on the impact of lifting 750 million rural and urban workers out of poverty since 1978 and the noticeable advances in achieving an ‘ecological civilisation’.

Chapter 6. Socialist Rule of Law

‘Governing the country according law [yifazhiguo]’ – this four-character phrase encapsulates a range of permutations, from the new Social Credit system, through core socialist values, to religious policy. However, it also has a distinct history that enables us to understand what it means in China, specifically as a socialist rule of law. Although traces of usage appear in much older texts, the key development is precisely during the Reform and Opening Up.

Initially (1978-1996), most of the debate centred around the opposition between ‘rule of human beings [renzhi]’ and ‘rule of law [fazhi]’, after which the latter became the agreed-upon position. Subsequently (1997-2011), the relationship between ‘rule of law’ and ‘legal system [fazhi]’ (sometimes misleadingly translated as ‘rule by law’) was debated, with the two clearly demarcated. Thus, while ‘legal system’ is the basis and concrete manifestation of ‘rule of law’, ‘rule of law’ is itself the ultimate framework and goal of the legal system. During this time, ‘governing the country according to law’ entered the 1999 revision of the Constitution. Finally (2012 to the present) we find increasing clarity of more and more aspects of rule of law, along with its consistent and impartial application. Tellingly, in 2018, the Constitution was revised further, replacing ‘improve the socialist legal system’ with ‘improve the socialist rule of law’.

Theory is crucial, but so is practice. The final part of the chapter examines some concrete manifestations of the rule of law in China: the Social Credit System as an effective and creative way to ensure rule of law at all levels; core socialist values as the positive side of the anti-corruption campaign; and ensuring that the long-standing laws on freedom of religion are strictly observed, especially in light of the revised Regulation on Religious Affairs (2018) and its emphases on self-government, self-support and self-propagation. In all of this, it should re remembered that we are speaking of a socialist rule of law, which is a crucial bulwark of China’s socialist system and is distinct from a capitalist rule of law.

Chapter 7. Sovereignty and Human Rights

This chapter offers a comparison between two traditions concerning human rights, through the prism of state sovereignty: the Western European liberal tradition and the Chinese Marxist tradition. It does so as follows. The first part introduces the distinction between false and rooted universals. A false universal forgets the conditions of its emergence and asserts that its assumptions apply to all irrespective of context, while a rooted universal is always conscious of and factors into analysis contextual origins, with their possibilities and limitations. With this distinction in mind, the next part deals with state sovereignty. In a Western European context, the standard narrative of this development has two main phases: the initial Westphalian definition (1648) and its significant restriction after the Second World War. The main problem with this narrative it that it largely neglects what drove the shift: the success of anti-colonial struggles in the first half of the twentieth century (the last phase through the United Nations under the inspiration of the Soviet Union). In light of this global perspective, it becomes clear that in formerly colonised and semi-colonised countries the very definition of sovereignty is transformed into an anti-colonial and non-theological definition. It is not simply an extension of the Westphalian definition, an assumption that entails a false universal. The next two parts of the argument deal directly with human rights. Initially, it focuses on the Western European tradition, which is predicated on the identification of human rights as private property and their restriction to civil and political rights. Here is the risk of another false universal: the assertion that this specific tradition applies to all, irrespective of context and of anti-colonial sovereignty. The final topic is the Chinese Marxist tradition of human rights, which arises from the intersections of Confucianism and Marxism. In this tradition, anti-colonial sovereignty is a prerequisite but does not determine human rights, and the core human right is the right to socio-economic wellbeing, through which civil, political, cultural and environmental rights arise.

Chapter 8. Minority Nationalities and the Anti-Colonial Project

The main topic of this chapter – minority nationalities policy –arises from the Chinese Marxist approaches to human rights. In brief, the comprehensive minority nationalities (which are sometimes called ‘ethnic groups’) emphasises the core human right to socio-economic wellbeing. Before we get to that point, we need to engage in historical analysis. The Soviet Union was the first socialist country to develop a comprehensive minorities policy, so much so that it was crucial in the very formation of the Soviet Union and was embodied in government structures. Much was learned, from both successes and failures. The Soviet Union was also the first country to see the intrinsic connection between an internal minorities policy and the international anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle. It supported most of them, from logistics and weapons to initiating declarations in the United Nations (especially the 1960 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, which forced France, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands, among others, to give up their colonies for the sake of independence).

But what did the minority policy entail? Here I turn to China, which – like other socialist countries – adopted the Soviet policy, adapting it and strengthening it in light of their own conditions. This ‘preferential policy [youhui zhengce]’ fosters minority languages, cultures, education, governance, and – above all – economic development as the basis for all the others. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s the policy was strengthened in a dialectical manner; minority rights and incentives were enhanced significantly, precisely as way of ensuring the inviolability of China’s borders. To give a sense of how this policy works, I deal with two pertinent case studies: Tibet and Xinjiang. In both cases, we find short-term and long-term programs. Short-term: enhanced fostering of security (anquan), stability (wending) and harmony (hexie), in order to counter the effects of separation, extremism and terrorism. Long-term: renewed and revised projects to improve the socio-economic wellbeing of all who live in Tibet and Xinjiang. At this point, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plays a significant internal role, with marked results in the six years or so of its implementation.

The BRI brings us finally to the question of international relations. Here we find a distinct development: while material from the 1950s and 1960s still used the terminology of anti-colonial struggle, it substantially disappears from use thereafter. Why? Already in the late 1950s, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had proposed the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, which was taken up with enthusiasm by Deng Xiaoping as China sought not confrontation but peaceful development (although he was also quite clear that China would always have closer connections with formerly colonised countries due to a shared common history). The more recent manifestation of this emphasis appears with Xi Jinping’s promotion of a ‘community of shared future for humankind [renlei mingyun gongtongti]’, concretely manifested in the BRI, and the policy – as an alternative to the Western European liberal emphasis on ‘zero-sum’ – of ‘both win, many win, all win’. Or simply, ‘win-win’.

Chapter 9. Xi Jinping on Marxism

Xi Jinping has confounded those international observers who ignored much of what I have discussed in the previous chapters and concluded that China had abandoned Marxism. But Xi Jinping’s resolute emphasis on Marxism makes perfect sense if we keep these developments of socialism with Chinese characteristics in mind. At the same time, it is true that Xi Jinping has also re-emphasised Marxism at its many levels, so much so that the CPC has been noticeably strengthened. Older members are once again proud of the party and what it has achieved, while young people are once again keen to join and study Marxism.

How did this happen? While Xi Jinping’s many writings and speeches (in the good tradition of communist leaders, he is also a thinker and writer) cover a wide range of topics, my focus is on his direct engagement with Marxism. The core piece for analysis is his major speech on the 200th anniversary of Marx’s birth, delivered on 5 May, 2018. While the speech deals with Marx’s biography (as an engaged intellectual), the basic premises of Marxism, its history as a living tradition and its emergence to sustained leadership in China, the main part of the speech elaborates on nine topics of relevance to China’s situation. Calling on all the ‘study Marx’ once again, he begins each sub-section with quotations from Marx and Engels and then elaborates on what they mean for the time after the communist revolution, during the complex and often difficult process of constructing socialism. The topics are: development of human society; sticking to the people’s standpoint; productive forces and relations of production; people’s democracy; cultural construction; social construction; human-nature relationship; world history; and Marxist party building. These topics open out to a series of other dimensions of Xi Jinping’s writings, with which I deal when analysing each section.

Conclusion

Given that most of the material in this book concerns material already known in China, it may be of interest to Chinese readers who wish to see what a foreigner engaged with and working in China thinks about socialism with Chinese characteristics. But I anticipate that it will mostly be of use to non-Chinese readers whose minds may already be open, or perhaps should be opened, to what such a socialism actually means in theory and practice.

Note

[1] The original four modernisations are: shaking off China’s poverty and backwardness [pinqiong luohou]; gradually improving the people’s living standards; restoring a position for China in international affairs commensurate with its current status; and enabling China to contribute more to humankind.

A photo for the ages: Xi Jinping on Chongqing poverty alleviation tour

China has set 2020 as the year for total alleviation of basic poverty, a key plank in the target to achieve a ‘xiaokang society’ – moderately well-off, healthy and secure for everyone. This was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping, who picked up an old Confucian term and reinterpreted it in light of Marxism, but it also pre-empts the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021. Or as Xi himself put it, stressing two sides of the dialectic of actually constructing socialism (liberating the forces of production and ensuring equality and justice for all): ‘Socialism means development. Development must serve the common prosperity for everyone‘.

As the date draws near, efforts are being stepped up in all aspects. This includes ensuring that people do not slip back into poverty later. China’s standards for poverty alleviation are somewhat higher than international standards, so this makes the project – especially for local CPC officials on the front line – even more demanding.

Recently, Xi Jinping undertook an inspection tour in poor areas of Chongqing. As Xinhua News reports, the visit had many levels, from a forum to visits to a poor village in the mountains. But I was taken with this photo. Look at the faces of the two girls who are shaking the hands of the person whom Fidel Castro called one of the strongest and most capable revolutionary leaders of the 21st century.

Chinese Rule of Law and Religion

In a small number of countries (former colonisers all) somewhat sensational and misinformed accounts have appeared of a new wave of religious ‘repression’ in China, targeted at Christian groups and certain forms of Islam (the Uyghur in Xinjiang). Crosses have been removed, churches have been closed down, pictures of Mao Zedong have been installed, and misguided believers have undertaken vocational and ideological training. What they do not say is that the only religious activities they mention are actually illegal. Why? They constitute so-called ‘house churches’, which are not registered with the government and are thereby outside the law. In this respect, they are no different from small Muslim cells in some (usually western) parts of China where extremism and radicalism are promoted. Obviously, these activities too are illegal.

What these reports miss is the underlying reason for such a development (I am never sure whether this is deliberate or due to ignorance). The reason lies in consistent, uniform and countrywide application of socialist rule of law. Since I have addressed the rule of law in an earlier piece, all that is needed here is a summary.

Rule of Law

On 11 March 2018, the annual National People’s Congress amended the preamble to the Constitution, from ‘improve the socialist legal system’ to ‘improve the socialist rule of law’. The change was only in the final character of the phrase, from 制 to 治 – although they have exactly the same pronunciation: zhì. Significantly, there is no inherent opposition between ‘legal system (fazhi)’ and ‘rule of law (fazhi)’: the former designates the legal system as one among others, such as economic, political and cultural systems; the latter indicates that law is foundational to all the other systems.

Why the shift? The reason lies in the opposition between ‘rule of law (fazhi)’ and ‘rule of human beings (renzhi)’. From the late 1970s to the 1990s, debate over this tension led to a clear preference for rule of law, since ‘rule of human beings’ recalled the ‘evil fruit (eguo)’ of the Cultural Revolution and the unwitting evocation of the sage-king whose virtue was key. In light of this debate, ‘rule of human beings’ came to influence the understanding of ‘legal system’, which at times bore the sense of ‘rule by law’. More specifically, the existence of a legal system was not enough to prevent ‘rule by human beings’. Thus, from 1997, we find the promotion of rule of law, or literally a ‘socialist rule of law country (shehuizhuyi fazhi guo)’, which entered the Constitution in 1999.

The test of all this is in practice, where the key phrase is ‘governing the country according to law (yifazhiguo)’, particularly ‘in all respects’ or ‘in an all-round way (quanmian)’. As Xi Jinping put it in his report to the CPC nineteenth congress in 2017: ‘We must promote the rule of law and work to ensure sound lawmaking, strict law enforcement, impartial administration of justice, and the observance of law by everyone’. It is precisely Xi Jinping – who is seen by some as an old-style communist hardman – who is assiduously promoting socialist rule of law. The implications are that everyone in China – from the highest officials through citizens to foreigners – is subject to the rule of law.

Religion

The impact is being felt in all areas, whether prostitution, corrupt CPC officials, foreigners on improper visas … Long is the list, but I would like to focus on the revised Regulation on Religious Affairs (published in 2017, coming into effect in early 2018). It is by no means new, for it continues an emphasis already apparent in the 1982 Constitution. As article 36 of that Constitution state: ‘Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief … The state protects legitimate religious activities. No one may use religion to carry out counter-revolutionary activities or activities that disrupt public order, harm the health of citizens or obstruct the educational systems of the state. No religious affairs may be dominated by any foreign country’.

The revised regulation of 2018 may be summarised in article 3: ‘protecting the legal, stopping the illegal, containing the extreme, resisting infiltration, and combating crimes’. Let us see what these phrases mean.

Protecting the legal (baohu hefa): legal religious activities are not only permitted, but also proactively protected by government at all levels. Examples of such activities include the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) churches of Protestant persuasion, the 2018 agreement between the Chinese government and Vatican on uniting the two arms of the Roman Catholic Church in China, Islamic institutions, Buddhism and so on. As the recent ‘white paper’ indicates, China now has 200 million believers of various faiths, of which the legal forms of Christianity number about 50 million. In other words, if you want to practice your religion in China, there are more than enough legally recognised ways to do so.

Stopping the illegal (zhizhi feifa): unregistered religious activities are illegal, including the ‘house churches’ that have been the focus of some sensationalised accounts in the small number of countries mentioned earlier. Through a complex and diverse history, some ‘house churches’ have developed more conservative evangelical theology, anti-communist assumptions and can be subject to foreign interventions by conservative international Christian bodies. Further, they can see themselves as the only genuine form of Christianity, dismissing organisations such as TSPM and its associated China Christian Council as ‘compromised’ or ‘heretical’. How is ‘stopping the illegal’ practiced? More directly, unregistered meeting places have been closed down, which has risen to a new level after the revised regulation – at times heavy-handedly and with reprimands from the government. Indirectly and informally, individual TSPM members often encourage those involved in ‘house churches’ to join registered churches, while TSPM ministers ensure that congregations are not tempted by ‘house church’ claims.

Containing the extreme (ezhi jiduan): the focus is not merely on terrorism in Xinjiang and Tibet, but also intolerance among other religious groups. Evangelical Christians, who tend to be found in unregistered ‘house churches’, are mostly at fault on this matter. In the new regulation and the white paper, key terms relating to these concerns appear: religious harmony (zongjiao hemu), social harmony (shehui hexie), stability or steadiness (wending) and security (anquan) – although each term is difficult to translate.

Resisting infiltration (diyu shentou): no religious organisation should be influenced or controlled by an outside body – a consistent feature of anti-colonial sovereignty.

Combatting crimes (daji fanzui): if ‘illegal’ includes sins of omission, ‘crime’ designates sins of commission.

By now it should be obvious what ‘governing the country according to the rule of law’ means in relation to religion. However, it is not a Western liberal approach to rule of law, which is framed to protect capitalism and the private individual. Instead, as an article by Chen Youwu and Li Buyun (2018) observes, ‘socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics’ arises from the fact that China follows the socialist road, which entails Marxist jurisprudence, takes account of China’s concrete conditions, socialist democracy and a socialist market economy.

To sum up: as socialist rule of law is being enforced across the country, everyone and every organisation is subject to this rule of law, which is central to the construction of socialism. In this respect, illegal religious activities are no different from: foreigners who operate in China under false pretences; the scam operators who used to be prevalent a decade or so ago; prostitution which has effectively been shut down in more and more parts of China; the fake student ID cards that used to be for sale close by where I live in Beijing; or the government official who secreted away monies in offshore accounts (these are rare indeed as I write).

Some may wish to practice religion in China and some may not, but if you want to do so, it is possible in perfectly legal ways. If not, watch out. The socialist rule of law is here to stay.

Fidel Castro: ‘Xi Jinping is one of the strongest and most capable revolutionary leaders I have met in my life’

Yes, Fidel Castro said this in 2014: ‘Xi Jinping is one of the strongest and most capable revolutionary leaders I have met in my life’.

This is noted in an article by Ajit Singh called ‘China: A Revolutionary Present’ (well worth a read).

A couple of decades earlier, Fidel also observed:

I think China is a socialist country, and Vietnam is a socialist nation as well. And they insist that they have introduced all the necessary reforms in order to motivate national development and to continue seeking the objectives of socialism. There are no fully pure regimes or systems. In Cuba, for instance, we have many forms of private property. We have hundreds of thousands of farm owners … Practically all Cubans own their own home and, what is more, we welcome foreign investment. But that does not mean that Cuba has stopped being socialist.

Riding the Anti-Fascist border route (on a Brompton)

Some like to call it the ‘Iron Curtain Trail’, a bicycle route running from the top of the Russian-Finnish border to the Black Sea.

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However, in the German parts there is a distinct reluctance to name the route in such a fashion. Every now and then, you may come across signs like this:

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But they are quite rare. Instead, you may find the ‘Green Belt Route’.

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Why the reluctance? German unity has always been a problem, as Engels analysed carefully in the 1880s. So no need to exacerbate differences. Another reason is that citizens of the former DDR object to the demonisation of their country by such a name. I would add that the author of the phrase ‘iron curtain’ was an extreme racist.

A far better name would be the ‘Anti-Fascist Route’. The reason: the border was in parts described in the same terms, representing a visible line preventing for a time NATO forces from moving further east.

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Korea takes another step in solving its own problems

While the United States is looking increasingly desperate and floundering, the two parts of Korea have taken yet another step in solving their own problems – a long-standing wish and policy, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions.

Yesterday, Moon Jae-in ducked across the informal border for a candid and unannounced discussion with a new friend, Kim Jong Un. As one does in Korea!

No better source that Rodong Sinmun to report on it (KCNA carries the same report):

The top leaders of the north and the south open-heartedly listened to each other’s opinions on the crucial pending matters without formality, and had a candid dialogue. The meeting offers another historic occasion in opening up a new chapter in the development of the north-south relations.

In a little more detail:

At the talks there were in-depth exchanges of opinions to tackle the matters that should be resolved to quickly implement the Panmunjom Declaration agreed upon at the third north-south summit and to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and achieve regional peace, stability and prosperity, and the matters the north and the south are now faced with, and the one of successfully holding the DPRK-U.S. summit.

Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae In shared the view that the two sides should trust and take care of each other and exert joint efforts to make sure that the Panmunjom Declaration reflecting the unanimous desire of all Koreans is implemented at an early date.

They agreed to hold the north-south high-level talks on coming June 1 and further accelerate the talks of various fields including the ones of military authorities and Red Cross.

They shared the opinion that they would meet frequently in the future to invigorate dialogue and pool wisdom and efforts, expressing their stand to make joint efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula …

The fourth north-south summit held at Panmunjom, recorded in history as a symbol of national reconciliation and unity, peace and prosperity, will provide all Koreans with a new hope and vitality.

Or as Moon himself observed after the meeting: ‘I wish to place a great meaning on the latest talks that were held as if they were an ordinary event between friends. I am convinced that this is the way that South and North Korea must meet’.

Meanwhile, the United States is feeling somewhat left out of all this, so they are now begging to meet Kim Jong Un in June – although by then matters will have moved on. The declaration of course includes the removal of hostile US troops from the peninsula.

To add another twist, KCNA debunks the spin that the DPRK is desperate for ‘economic aid’ from the United States. Simply put, the DPRK does not need that kind of assistance, not least because it has China’s backing and has been doing quite well of late.

The article observes:

This is the nonsense of hack media on the payroll of power, ignorant of who is the rival …

Now that U.S. media are still building up public opinion that the DPRK comes to the negotiating table with the U.S. in a hope to get “economic aid” from it, we can not but make the fact clear.

It is the U.S. that asked for DPRK-U.S. talks first.

The U.S. has recently come to realise that the military strength, it regards as almighty, and the anti-DPRK sanctions, it pinned hope on, were all doomed to failure. After all, there could be no other way out for the U.S.

The international community contends that the world-startling dramatic change in the DPRK-U.S. ties was entirely thanks to the DPRK’s efforts for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the world.

As far as the “economic aid” advertised by the U.S. is concerned, the DPRK has never expected it.

U.S. media would be well advised to stop talking nonsense as hack media and deeply study what the strategic line advanced at the historic April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea means.

Finally, a useful piece in Rodong Sinmun called ‘Let Us Give Full Play to the Advantages of Socialism’.

Pictures from yesterday’s meeting:

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K&M 02

The text by Moon Jae-in reads: ‘Peace and Prosperity of the Korean Peninsula, together with Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea! May 26, 2018. President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae In’.

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And here is a video report of the meeting:

Codes and Conspiracies, or, Trying to Understand the Infantile Disorder of ‘Left-Wing’ Communism

From time to time, I try to understand those who believe that China has made or is still making a transition from socialism to capitalism. Earlier, I explored the orientalist dimensions of this belief, as well as the reliance on a ‘betrayal narrative’, but here I would like to focus on the need to rely on codes. In brief: all of the statements by the CPC, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, function as a code. They say one thing but actually mean something else. So what one needs is the key to the code, after which one can set to work deciphering the various statements.

What is the key to this code? According to those who believe in the code, the key is a conspiracy: from Deng Xiaoping onwards a vast conspiracy has been unfolding, which is nothing less than the transition from socialism to capitalism. I will not go into the details here as to why this conspiracy theory arose, based as it was on selected interpretation of events in the 1980s and even 1990s. Instead, I am interested in how the need for a code arises from the conspiracy theory.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is through a few examples.

There are more obvious examples, such as the hypothesis that the ‘reform and opening up’ (celebrating 40 years in 2018) is not so much the necessary process of reform after a communist revolution (already clear from Lenin’s work), but simply a code for the passage to capitalism. Or the ‘socialist market economy’ is a coded way of speaking about capitalism with government ‘interference’ – neglecting the historical fact that a capitalist market economy is only one form of market economies.

But there are some more intriguing examples. To begin with, Deng Xiaoping famously said that if one wishes to cross a river, one must feel each stone on the river bed at a time with one’s feet. The obvious meaning of this statement is that the passage to socialism, and then communism, requires careful attention to each problem, each fact, which requires analysis and solution. But no, for those who believe in the conspiracy theory, he was speaking in a code: crossing a river entails going from one bank to another. Since China was socialist at one point, they believe, the other bank must be capitalism. A bit of a stretch, given that Deng made it clear China was in the preliminary stage of socialism.

More recently – 2017 at the nineteenth congress of the CPC – Xi Jinping famously announced a new primary contradiction that would guide government policy. This contradiction is between uneven and unequal development and the people’s desire for a better life (meihua shenghuo). Apart from drawing straight out of Mao Zedong’s major essay, ‘On Contradiction’, Comrade Xi made it clear that a ‘better life’ meant not only a ‘moderately prosperous society (xiaokang shehui)’ by 2020, but a ‘strong modern socialist country’ by 2050, which would be achieved through socialist modernisation. At the core of all this is Marxist political economy and the construction of socialism.

But what do our conspiracy theorists make of this? The desire for a ‘better life’ is a code for the full transition to capitalism.

Now we come the obvious problem of this use of a code. The more Xi Jinping makes Marxism central to China’s project, the harder one must work to fit it all into the code. Anomalies appear, much thought is devoted to working the many pieces into the code … so much so that even doctoral theses are devoted to deciphering the code (outside China). A waste of energy.

I am reminded of someone who taught me biblical languages many, many years ago. She believed that the New Testament was a massive code that really talked about specific events at the Qumran community (which wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls, as many hold). I recall her coming into class on some days full of excitement: she had cracked another part of the code that had been bothering her. Do not get me wrong: she taught me Hebrew, Syriac and Coptic very well indeed. The discussions about her code-cracking were held around the edges of class time. But the experience has made me acutely aware of how much time and energy people devote to deciphering codes after they have believed in a core conspiracy.

All of which brings me back to Lenin and his great booklet from 1920, ‘“Left-Wing” Communism – An Infantile Disorder’. Lenin’s immediate target may have been different, but the problem persists. Stalin faced the problem, as did Mao, Deng and indeed Xi Jinping today. Among the international Left one can find such ‘left-wing’ communists from time to time and they are keen to find the occasional person in China who is happy to pander to their desires. I find it both a lazy approach and one that faces immense problems to sustain not only the great conspiracy, but also to need to believe in a vast code that they must constantly seek to reinforce.

Get used to it: Chinese influence is the CPC’s influence

Another good article in the Global Times concerning the CPC on the international arena, called ‘CPC’s role cannot be detached from Chinese influence‘. As China becomes a global power once again, some countries have begun expressing a close-minded concern about the ‘evil’ effects of the CPC, trying to distinguish between Chinese influence and the role of the CPC.

The catch is that you can’t detach them so. As the article points out:

With its 89 million-strong members, consisting mainly of the elite of different sectors, the CPC is a team representing the backbone of Chinese society. The CPC’s organizing ability, inclusive policies and acceptance of differing ideas, has proven essential to helping the country weather various storms since the CPC’s founding in 1921.

As the CPC continues to lead China’s ascent, the influence of China and the CPC is deeply integrated and one cannot be separated from the other.

The many who work to further Chinese influence at all manner of levels consciously also promote the CPC – they have not been strong-armed into doing so. After all, who does not want the ‘community of shared future’, which is the core of Chinese international engagement.

The more international influence of the CPC, the better, if you ask me.

Returning to socialist realism

Socialist realism has had a bad press. Due to Cold War mindsets and the corroding effects of liberalism, many still see it as a crude ideological imposition on the freedom of artists, writers, film makers and so on. ‘Stultifying’, ‘stilted’, a sign of Stalin’s ‘dictatorship’ – these and more are some of the observations you still hear. A common narrative is that after the creativity of the late 1910s and early 1920s in the Soviet Union, Stalin stifled these developments in favour of a ‘conservative’ artistic agenda.

But I have travelled enough and seen enough art, sculpture, posters and so on to realise that socialist realism is an amazing genre, producing some fantastic art. It was the dominant genre in the Soviet Union from the mid-1902s until the 1980s. It also deeply influenced other socialist states, from Eastern Europe to Asia, and it is still manifest in the DPRK, Vietnam, Laos and China. As for literature, long ago I read Mikhail Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the Don (1935-1940). Regarded as one of the greatest works of the twentieth century, it focuses on the lives of the Don Cossacks before and after the Russian Revolution. And it has the unique distinction of being awarded both the Stalin Prize in 1941 and the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1965. From a different part of the world, I recently completed ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi’s alArd (1954), translated as Egyptian Earth. Not only is this one of the great Egyptian novels, and not only did it break dramatically from traditional Arabic literature, but it was inspired by socialist realism. In other words, this genre had a significant effects in many parts of the world, especially in the context of anti-colonial struggles.

It is high time for a complete reassessment of a major artistic genre.