Images from Chinese socialism today

Welcome to China, where communist banners are back in a big way. The latest series concerns the 19th congress of the CPC (shijiuda):

Apart from following events very closely, I took myself to the local Xinhua Bookshop, to find a huge number of Xi Jinping’s books for sale – carrying on the tradition of communist leaders who actually think and write:

Almost 20 books to read over the southern summer, along with Mao’s works:

In many places, I also came across signs reminding one of the achievements of Chinese socialism:







Discovering Chinese Socialism: A Personal Account

Despite my best intentions, I had first come to China some eleven years ago with a pile of preconceptions and ways of understanding socialism. One by one they have been challenged, undermined and then crumbled. Since then, I have been rebuilding my understanding virtually from scratch.

Some of these preconceptions were superficial, although I was not aware I held them until after arrival. For example, I had been warned that a paranoid communist party would send spies to watch my every move. Even though I found this somewhat ludicrous, I caught myself, despite my best intentions, wondering if I was indeed being tailed. Another was the oft-repeated comment that no-one in China ‘believes’ in Marxism anymore, indeed that Chinese people barely talk about it. This particular fib took about 24 hours to undo, since I found not only that people freely talk about Marxism and socialism as everyday matters, but that everyone has studied these subjects at school.

Other preconceptions were more deeply ingrained: the idea that socialism can be reduced to economic matters; that China had embraced capitalism somewhere between 1979 and 1989; that Mao Zedong was the good boy and Deng Xiaoping the bad boy; that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ had little to do with socialism; indeed, that a ‘socialist market economy’ is a meaningless term; as for any form of democracy or ‘human rights’, forget it, since the communist party is not interested. I should add that I had a number of ways of understanding socialism that had developed during a long immersion in European Marxism, with its specific assumptions concerning philosophy and ways of looking at the world.

To have these assumptions dismantled has been a disconcerting process, to say the least. But it has also been exhilarating and full of new insights. By this time, more than a decade later, I hold none of the positions I have mentioned. However, the process has often involved constructing a new position that turned out to be a half-way house, a transitional point to something else. In short, I continue to dismantle nearly all of the categories that I had assumed as givens and have been working hard to construct new ones based on extensive exposure to Chinese Marxism.

Where to begin?

Human Rights

Perhaps ‘human rights’ was the easiest one to dismantle. I had always been suspicious of the very idea of human rights, given that it was first proposed by the Dutch philosopher and jurist, Hugo Grotius, in the sixteenth century. Grotius made a crucial shift, from a singular ‘Right’ characteristic of the Middle Ages (and inescapably connected with God) to plural ‘rights’. Already he saw these rights – such as life, freedom and so on – as commodities that could be acquired or sold. So I did not pay much attention to the routine use of ‘human rights’ in international efforts to denigrate China and its supposed ‘abuses’.

However, while filming for an online course (MOOC) on Chinese Marxism, I travelled to Ruijin, where the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet was established in the early 1930s. Here developed what may be called the ‘Ruijin ethos’: focus first on the people’s need for food, shelter, clothing and security, and then they will become communists. This opened the door to understanding a Chinese Marxist approach to human rights. Yes, such rights are universal, but they are rooted in specific situations and histories. Thus, the European tradition focuses on individual political and civil rights, but it neglects the crucial right to economic wellbeing (with significant consequences). It is precisely this right that emerged with the Ruijin ethos, with a distinctly collective focus. And it continues to be expressed in any number of government policies, ranging from the minority nationalities policy to the Belt and Road Initiative. So there is a Chinese Marxist tradition of human rights, arising in a very different situation, with different emphases. This is not to say that political and civil rights are neglected, but they must be understood in this broader framework.

Socialist Democracy

As for ‘democracy’, on this matter too I had earlier suspicions. I mean here suspicions about bourgeois democracy and the claim that this particular form of democracy is ‘democracy’ as such, without any qualifiers. I had experienced and studied enough to know the vacuousness of such claims, that bourgeois democracy based on parliamentary parties was only one historical manifestation of democracy, with its significant limitations. But I did have some idea of what an alternative might be, with direct participation by all, election and revocation, a search for a collective will – a little like Marx on the Paris commune. This is socialist democracy, I thought to myself. That my perception had significant doses of anti-statism goes without saying, for is not the state an alienated entity out of touch with the people? That it was also deeply informed by a (neo-)liberal framework was not so clear to me at the time, a situation that I now realise feeds into the popularity of anarchism in those parts of the world where liberalism is the dominant framework. With these preconceptions in mind, China was not going to manifest any form of socialist democracy.

The breakdown of this preconception began with the discovery that elections happen all the time in China. In local elections, whether in the countryside or city regions, one can elect the local government representatives. They can be communist party candidates or non-party candidates. What about the process of electing people for the two houses of parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)? The process begins in villages and in the local people’s assemblies, which may elect as many people as they wish. However, the number elected is usually no more than fifty percent over the number of places available. From there, elections continue through a number of layers until the provincial people’s assembly, from which the final number of delegates are elected. Once elected, a delegate serves for five years. In other words, the process is one of direct and indirect elections. A similar process applies for electing delegates to the Communist Party’s congress.

Clearly, this is a democratic exercise. But the question remains: what about the Communist Party itself? Can it be voted in or out of power? For many, this question is the test of ‘real democracy’. The problem is that the question itself betrays the hegemony of bourgeois democratic assumptions, in which multiple parties which look rather like one another vie for power, without questioning the overall framework. Obviously, this does not apply in China, which is not a bourgeois democracy. However, the role of the Communist Party in democracy took me a while longer to determine.

In short, a Communist Party must be in power for socialist democracy to function. This may initially seem like a paradox, but it is not. Let me put it this way, using the category of ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. When first used by Marx and Engels and then developed by Lenin and Stalin, the proletarian democracy was a centralised and repressive force, in which the majority – workers and peasants – made use of the machinery of state to absorb and crush their opponents, who had once constituted the ‘dictatorship of the bourgeoisie’. The key here is the majority, which is able to express its will. Yet, this is only the beginning. In a Chinese situation, Mao Zedong transformed this category into ‘democratic dictatorship’, which he saw as ‘democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries’ (1949). Note the shift: the proletariat have become ‘the people [renmin]’ and they are the ones who rule. In fact, the Chinese minzhu reminds us of the core meaning of ‘democracy’, the people are in charge, are masters. All of this would be fully expressed by Deng Xiaoping in his four cardinal principles, of which the second is ‘upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship [renminminzhuzhuanzheng]’. But who are the people here? They are the workers, farmers and what may be called a socialist middle class, although ‘middle class’ is really not the best term here, since it evokes the specifics of the European history of the bourgeoisie. Instead, these are the people who have been lifted out of poverty and find the socialism has in fact improved their lives. The import of Deng Xiaoping’s formula is that the ‘people’ includes everyone. And who leads and represents them, through complex patterns of elections, public opinion, feedback from other political parties and policy? The next item in Deng’s principles provides the answer: leadership of the Communist Party.

Contradiction Analysis

Now I am digging into material that required and continues to require much more rethinking. So it is a good time to pause and identify a key experience. It concerns what may at first seem like a rather abstract idea: contradiction. But this idea has profound and very concrete implications.

The first moment of this experience was a discussion with a Chinese colleague over ‘utopia’. In a European context, utopia is of course both a non-place (utopia) and a good place (eutopia), but it entails some idea of perfection. Here tensions and conflicts are overcome, harmony and peace are achieved. Isn’t this the same as the Chinese datong, the ‘Great Harmony’? I asked. Well no, my colleague pointed out. This ancient Confucian idea, which has subsequently been reshaped in the tradition as a future state and then appropriated and reinterpreted by the communists (Mao was fond of it), actually does not mean ‘perfection’ as I had understood it. Instead, it means that opposites and indeed contradictions are still present, but they are not in conflict with one another. Think of yin-yang, she said: not only are the opposites entwined with one another, but if you look closely, you will see one side in the middle of the other.

The second moment was an extraordinary seminar, in which we read Mao’s ‘On Contradiction’ very carefully over six weeks. I had been struggling for some time concerning the presence of contradictions under socialism. According to a certain ‘Western’ approach, contradictions are supposed to disappear: swept away would be classes, economic exploitation, ideological conflict, if not the state itself. Through my work on the Soviet Union, especially in light of its achievement of socialism in the 1930s (my awareness of this reality also took time), I had begun to realise that contradictions do happen under socialism. So I was in the process of painstakingly tracking how Marxist thought came to terms with this reality.

Some of the other participants in the seminar were somewhat impatient with me. Of course, contradictions appear with socialism! Mao’s essay makes this very, very clear. But what sort of contradictions? Are not contradictions meant to indicate struggle and conflict? Many parts of the essay address the nature of contradictions and their relations to one another. But one of the most significant is the last part, concerning ‘non-antagonistic contradictions’. Here Mao picks up an idea that had begun to be explored in the Soviet Union, where classes were present under socialism, as well as tensions between the forces and relations of production. But Mao took it much further in light of Chinese philosophy. At one point, he quotes a four-character Chinese saying: xiangfan xiangcheng, ‘things that oppose each other also complement one another’. Thus, contradictions can always become antagonistic, leading to conflict, as one finds with events leading to a communist revolution. But they can also be non-antagonistic if they are handled properly. This is precisely Mao’s emphasis in an essay from 1957, in the early days of beginning to construct socialism. It is called ‘On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People’, in which he advises the party to focus on ensuring that the contradictions that exist should not become antagonistic.

The third moment made me realise how important this ‘contradiction analysis’ is in China today. I happened to be in Beijing during the nineteenth congress of the CPC in October 2017. The anticipation in China was palpable and more global attention was focused on this congress than any of the earlier ones. In a major speech of more than three hours, in which Xi Jinping outlined the shape of a whole new phase of Marxism in China, he identified a new primary contradiction: between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life. Not only did this approach straight out of Mao’s approach, but it also invoked a traditional four-character saying, meihua shenghuo, a beautiful and good life. It was now being claimed from a long tradition and being reinterpreted in a Marxist framework. By now my sense of what contradiction means in a Chinese context had a little depth, especially in light of the aim to become a great modern socialist country by the middle of the twenty-first century.

Socialist Market Economy

Over the years that I have been discussing, thinking about and studying the question of contradiction, I have also found myself pondering economic questions.

I initially tried to bring the two together – contradiction and economics – once I realised that socialism does have a distinct place in China rather than some rampant and unbridled form of capitalism. Still I relied on European categories to try to understand this situation, especially the Marxist who has influenced me in so many ways – Ernst Bloch. I began to argue that the primary contradiction (under Mao’s influence) is in fact socialism and capitalism. I explored a number of ways in which this might work, ending with the suggestion that subsequent modes of production do not cancel out the preceding ones. Instead, they absorb the contradictions of the earlier ones and transform them in the new context. If you can see this with capitalism, you could also argue that this dialectical process also takes place with socialism. So you would expect to see all manner of mechanisms and forms of capitalism appearing under socialism, especially in terms of unleashing the forces of production, but they would be transformed in the new framework. I still think that this particular point about modes of production holds and that it is a very Marxist approach. In many ways, it makes sense of what happened in the Soviet Union and it assists in understanding the process through which China is going – well beyond the Soviet Union.

However, I still could not make sense of a ‘socialist market economy’. Why? I assumed that a market economy is the same as capitalism and that if China had some form of market economy it must have some form of capitalism. This assumption is so ingrained among so many people, specialists or not, that it is difficult to challenge. For me, the penny dropped very slowly. I realise now that this assumption is actually a manifestation of what is called ‘economics imperialism’. This means that neoclassical economics – a major tradition for understanding capitalism – managed to forget its history and its social location. It became individualised and universalised, making claims about human nature as such. Human beings, they assume, are rational and self-interested actors, who will always make the best economic decision for themselves. Armed with this universal doctrine, they set about describing everything from psychology to religion as manifestations of economic activity. In short, we are capitalists by our very nature. This ‘economics imperialism’ also meant that you could use universal terms: neoclassical economics became simply ‘economics’, and a capitalist market economy became a ‘market economy’. Thus, wherever and whenever you can espy a market economy, you have capitalism in some form. This is a pervasive assumption that is simply wrong.

It certainly took a while for me to realise why. The first real step was actually historical. I had been engaged in research on the ancient world, specifically ancient Southwest Asia (often called the Ancient Near East) and the Greco-Roman world. I was seeking to develop a new economic model for understanding some four and a half thousand years of economic history. On the way, I discovered that markets had spread significantly under the Persians in the first millennium BCE and then under the Greeks and Romans. What sort of markets? Debate rages among those who are interested in such matters. Many simply assumed that they were capitalist markets – a little crude and primitive, but still capitalist. In this club, you find assumptions concerning the primacy of profit, supply and demand, the independence of the market economy, and so on. Others argued against this approach, pointing out that states played a determining role, that prices were not determined by supply and demand, and that such markets were socially embedded.

At a crucial point, I realised that this debate is futile, or rather, that it misses the mark. The reason: they were certainly market economies, but they were different beasts from capitalist market economies. Thus, the one fostered by the Persians can be called a logistical market economy, or perhaps a tax market economy. The Persians developed their particular market economy to deal with a logistical problem: how to provision armies. At some point, they hit on the idea of paying soldiers in coin (newly invented) and demanding taxes in coin. But how could the people get hold of the coins to pay taxes? Sell food, clothing and what have you to the soldiers on the move. If someone made a little profit on the side, then that was a secondary benefit.

The Greeks and then the Romans developed a different market economy. When ‘classical’ Greece emerged from the centuries-long period of so-called economic ‘collapse’ (if one assumes a ruling class perspective), they had developed a slave economy. Surplus for the ruling class was primarily generated through slaves, which every respectable Greek male citizen owned. But they had to get hold of slaves, which were sources in all manner of ways. For this purpose, slave markets developed, with massive market concentrations in the eastern Mediterranean. The Romans ‘perfected’ – if I can use such a term – this system so that we can speak of a slave market economy. The whole market economy was geared and shaped for the purpose of finding, transporting and selling slaves.

Here were two types of market economy that were clearly not capitalist, because profit was not the main driver and the whole capitalist surplus value certainly did not apply. This awareness led me to realise that most market economies throughout history have been anything but capitalist. Indeed, a capitalist market economy as we know it first began with the Dutch Empire in the sixteenth century.

By now the implications should be obvious for a socialist market economy. It too can develop in a way that is not capitalist, even in a global framework that can be seen as largely capitalist. How so? My thoughts on this are at the beginning stage, but I can indicate a number of features beyond my earlier musings.

To begin with, the old opposition between public (or state) and private ownership does not apply. This opposition has become a leitmotiv of those who try to determine whether an economy is more or less ‘socialistic’, so much so that a ‘socialist’ turn involves ‘nationalising’ key industries. This model is simply unusable in China, of not misleading. Thus, the percentage of public or private ownership is not a marker of whether a national economy is more or less socialistic. It takes some effort to get beyond this opposition, but let us try. In China, the fabled state-owned enterprises – the backbone of the economy – are undergoing a process of eradicating old inefficiencies by learning from ‘private’ enterprises and even entering into partnerships with those enterprises. At the same time, every enterprise, whether ‘private’ or ‘public’ – or rather the many enterprises with are part ‘private’ and ‘public’, village or local government owned enterprises, ‘new economic organisations’, start-ups and so on – with more than three CPC members must have a party organisation with an elected party secretary. This means that every enterprise with more than 100 employees must have a core CPC unit within it, exercising a managerial role. Even more, every foreign enterprise or multinational must also have a CPC unit at its core. If I add that the CEOs of China’s biggest companies are also members of the CPC, then we are beginning to understand what may be called ‘enmeshment’ – as is showing up significantly with the Belt and Road Initiative. Much more could be said on this topic (and it needs further research), but it is leading to creative efforts to rethink the situation in terms of a ‘commons’ that is far from any notion of a bourgeois civil society, or indeed the very idea of a socialist market economy itself that moves well beyond the bourgeois distinction of public and private ownership.[1]

Further, the capitalist ‘law’ of value does not apply to a socialist market economy.[2] The production of surplus value is not the determining feature of this market economy, or – if one wishes to put it in other terms – profit for the sake of profit, based on the autonomous dynamic of a ‘market, is not primary by any means (even with foreign influence since China has to deal with capitalist market economies). We might put it this way: under the law of value, ‘unprofitable’ industries would be shut down in favour of ‘profitable’ ones. But this is not the best way of putting it. Instead, the very idea of profitability is transformed. Instead of short-term analyses of whether a particular venture will return a profit, a longer view prevails in which a project is assessed in terms of its larger and long-term benefit – or ‘social surplus’. Again and again, I have been told by Chinese people involved in all manner of businesses that they must meet a whole series of criteria for business reporting. Of these, profit is only secondary. Of course, they must viable in terms of efficiency, paying employees and having resources for future activity, but the whole aim in not based on returns to shareholders. Instead, they are assessed in terms social benefit, environmental improvement, education, contribution to socialism with Chinese characteristics, among others.

The test-case here is the Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative is really an extension of the Chinese focus on infrastructure. As many know, China has been constructing new roads, bridges, schools, universities, accommodation, the world’s best rail network (including but not limited to the massive high-speed network), world-class internet, share economy, and so on. The Belt and Road Initiative is the global manifestation of this drive. It contrasts sharply with the ‘neoliberal’ emphasis on trying the produce money out of money through speculation. Anyone who visits the USA today can see the contrast, where infrastructure is literally crumbling. As one wit put it to me recently: North Korea has recently built a new international airport in Pyongyang, while the USA has not built a new one for a long time. Indeed, a neo-liberal assessment of infrastructure investment argues that it does produce ‘returns’ on investment in perhaps a ten-year period. This kind of analysis completely misses the point of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is long term and focused not merely on China’s benefits, but all those involved.[3]

A final note on what will no doubt be a much longer analysis. Much has been made in some quarters of the Chinese billionaires and the relatively high Gini coefficient (although it has been falling for a decade). This is one of the new contradictions – among others – that has arisen in the process of the reform and opening up. Chinese economists tell me that the approach followed is that the reform and opening up by no means complete, so this tension should be resolved with further reform. Three recent signs are telling. The first is the directive to Chinese companies investing abroad to shift their focus to the BRI, which they are now doing. This may be coupled with the fact that it is simply expected in Chinese culture that those who have benefitted will contribute to the wider social good, so we see a massive scale of contributions and systemic investment in education, medicine and so on. The second is the identification of the new contradiction at the nineteenth congress. The initial part of the contradiction speaks of ‘unbalanced and uneven development’. While this includes problems between city and country, and between east and west, part of this situation is relative wealth disparity. Finally, the renewed focus on the poverty alleviation program, which has been ongoing for forty years, is another signal of a concentration of attention on this problem.

Socialism is More Than Economics

I have spent quite some time with the socialist market economy. In doing so, I have fallen into the trap of economism. By this I mean that so many Marxists assume that the definition of socialism turns on economic matters. Or to use the base-superstructure model, the base is all that counts. This is simply vulgar Marxism.

By contrast, I have learned that socialism is far more than economics.

It includes culture, which has a long history indeed in China. Is Marxism simply a political ideology in China that has little bearing on people’s day-to-day lives? Not at all. This reality came home to me when speaking with some students about contradiction (yes, contradiction once again). They told me how they had been taught about contradiction analysis, implicitly in primary school and then explicitly in middle and high schools. But they also said that they lived their lives according to contradiction. This is how they understand the world, how they comprehend and interpret what happens in their lives. This was one manifestation of the away socialism has entered into the fabric of Chinese culture, so much so that the claim that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has a 2,000-year history gains some meaning. In other words, the CPC and the socialism it fosters is the nurturer and bearer of Chinese culture today.

What about society? I could mention the development of a whole new dimension of Chinese society that has benefitted from the poverty alleviation program of the last forty years (700 million lifted out of poverty and counting). Some might call this a ‘middle class’, but this is really a place-holder until we find a better term. I could also mention the new problems that have arisen in terms of city and countryside, with a massive and controlled movement of people to the cities (some 250 million country people work regularly in the cities). But I will focus here on what are called ‘core socialist values’. This shows up particularly in the intersection between traditional Chinese ethics and socialist ethics, or rather, in the transformation of the former in light of the latter. Thus, a communist party member, or indeed anyone in a responsible role in society, has a higher ethical expectation. One must focus on the good of others rather than seek personal gain, be scrupulously honest and direct, living a simple life. This is what ‘communist’ means in China. No wonder that the problem with corruption not five years ago was such a deep problem, until the thorough and ongoing anti-corruption campaign that has restored the standing of the CPC among the people. No wonder that the fall for someone who does meet these expectations is so great. And no wonder that the expectations of the CPC are so high.

Ideology is also crucial, but since the term can have negative connotations for some, perhaps I should speak of theory. On this score, the last five years have been particularly important. Compulsory education for all students in schools and universities is undergoing a complete overhaul so that the courses on Marxism and socialism with Chinese characteristics are relevant to the daily lives of students. I must admit that I am intrigued by the fact that even when they are taught badly they still influence the lives of students in ways that even they do not expect (see above on contradiction) But if they are taught well, as in increasingly the case, the impact is even greater. You also find that all party members (dangyuan) must meet monthly to study an essay from Xi Jinping. The purpose is obvious: to raise the theoretical knowledge of party members. They also need to undertake regular refresher courses in the party schools dotted about the country. On this matter my colours come out more clearly (if they are not already clear). I think this is a fantastic development, especially in light of the old communist saying: without theory we are dead.

Political matters are also important, but this should be obvious. The CPC is the ruling party of the country. But it now has a radically increased theoretical level, a strict disciplinary emphasis, and a distinct confidence and strength that was not so evident five or more years ago.

These many dimensions of socialism, of which I have gradually become aware in China, indicate that one needs to be more comprehensive in assessing socialism itself. Recently, I was asked by China’s leading political economist whether I think the Soviet Union was a socialist society. I pondered the question and mentioned that one needs to assess the many facets I have outlined – economics, culture, society, ideology, politics. If we weigh these factors up, then yes, the Soviet Union was socialist. The implication: China today is socialist, far more than I ever anticipated.

The New Era

Not a few weeks before writing this piece (November 2017), the nineteenth congress of the CPC took place in Beijing. I was in China at the time and followed the congress very closely. Among its many features, ranging from Xi Jinping Thought becoming part of the constitution of the CPC, through identifying a new primary contradiction, to setting a target for becoming a great modern socialist country by 2050, I was struck by the way Marxism was front and centre of Xi Jinping’s presentation. This was simply not a problem for Chinese people. Chinese socialism was identified as entering a new era, so people set about discussing what this means.

Perhaps it is best to go back to Deng Xiaoping’s insight. To be sure, the designation of Xi Jinping Thought evokes Mao Zedong Thought – sixiang, thought, only attaches to two of China’s communist leaders. But the genius of Deng lies behind it. He was the one who picked up the threads after Mao’s deviation and the great forgetting during the Cultural Revolution. What is socialism? For Deng it is not some liberal notion of equality – what Engels’s calls gleichheitskommunismus, or egalitarian communism – in which everyone is equally poor. Instead, socialism is about the unleashing of the forces of production so that everyone’s lives improves. Improvement not merely in economic terms, but also culturally, spiritually, socially, ideologically and politically. This is the meaning of socialism with Chinese characteristics (zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi), of Marxism transformed in a Chinese situation (Makesizhuyi zhongguohua), and the desire for a better life (meihua shenghuo).

Of course, the problem with writing a piece such as this is that I may be seen as a mouthpiece of the CPC. But then people who work for Confucius Institutes are also called such names. That aside, it is clear that an immense amount of effort and research on these questions continues in China. And it is clear that the CPC is absolutely serious about its project.

[1] There is much debate about how a socialist market economy has come about. Proposals include: distinct planning by the CPC; clear distinction from Yugoslav ‘market socialism’; shifting policies in response to new developments; and – intriguingly – happenstance as the by-product of other policies.

[2] A useful starting point for the law of value under socialism is Stalin’s ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ from 1952. He has a brief discussion of value, although China’s situation has developed well beyond the Soviet Union and is much more complex.

[3] As Michael Roberts puts it: ‘This also lends the lie to the common idea among some Marxist economists that China’s export of capital to invest in projects abroad is the product of the need to absorb ‘surplus capital’ at home, similar to the export of capital by the capitalist economies before 1914 that Lenin presented as key feature of imperialism. China is not investing abroad through its state companies because of ‘excess capital’ or even because the rate of profit in state and capitalist enterprises has been falling’.


Xi Jinping Thought

What a time to be in China! What a time indeed.

Happenstance would have it that I was in Beijing for the nineteenth congress of the Communist Party of China. Usually, such events barely raise interest outside China, except perhaps for the rare Marxist actually interested in the place or – that ambivalent term – a ‘China hand’. And if some foreign commentator happens to notice, they will trot out some rusty formulae concerning arcane language, obtuse signals and look for signs of a ‘totalitarian’ state – without trying to find out much real information.

Not this time.

Something big was afoot. Everywhere I went in China in the weeks leading up the congress I encountered banners, signs and posters. ‘Welcome to the 19th congress of the CPC’, one said. ‘Study carefully Xi Jinping’s writings’, said another. ‘The 19th congress will lead to a better life [meihua shenghuo]’, said a third, invoking an ancient Chinese saying.

Security was tight, very tight. Internet systems were down or slow. Foreigners found themselves asked for passports and even urine samples if they happened to frequent expat bars (I avoid them). Almost one million citizen groups in Beijing were mobilised to keep an eye out for suspicious activity. Let alone the party members in town who had plain-clothes guard duty rosters for the lead-up and duration of the congress. Even social networking was tightened up: you could not change any item on your profile on wechat until the end of October.

In this buzz I zeroed in on the many levels of information available.

On the 18th of October, the congress began, with Xi Jinping slated to give a speech. And what a speech it was: 205 minutes non-stop, or 3 hours and 25 minutes. Clearly, the most important speech in his 63 years.

But what did he say?

Marxism has roared back to the centre of Chinese thought, policy and direction for the future. Not a mean achievement, especially after it seemed to be somewhat soft-pedalled not five years or more ago, before Xi became chairman (zhuxi, also translated as ‘president’). Marxism would be – no, is – the guiding light, the beacon to the future.

Marxist political economy is setting the agenda for a very different economic approach. This is called a socialist market economy – and the Chinese are very serious about what is an increasingly clear alternative to a capitalist market economy. The speech outlined five main factors: 1) furthering supply-side structural reform; 2) fostering innovation at all levels to increase China’s global leadership; 3) rural revitalisation; 4) coordinated regional development; 5) further opening up on all fronts. And the institutional mechanisms for each are already established.

But let me emphasise the following dimensions underlying this socialist market economy. The model clearly being followed is an alternative to neo-liberalism, which loves financial speculation and estimates based on short-term profit yields. Instead, the Chinese model takes the long view. Infrastructure is the key, within China and without. Think of the Belt and Road Initiative, already to reshape the world, let alone seeking to reshape the uneven development of China internally (focused on the western parts).

Further, the simplistic opposition between ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors of the economy is now obsolete. For example, any ‘private’ company of over 100 employees has a core communist party cell. Each multinational company that wishes to engage with China – and so many do – must have a communist cell within it. What do we call this approach? I prefer to call it an ‘enmeshed’ economy, in which the CPC is interwoven with an equally interwoven ‘public’ and ‘private’ sector. What appears initially to be a ‘private’ economic project is inescapably enmeshed with the CPC, while the ‘public’ companies (SOEs) are being revitalised by active interaction with the ‘private’ ones. Even more, the mighty SOEs, revamped and more efficient, are starting to become multi-nationals themselves through many projects. Obviously, this has significant global implications.

But Marxism is much more than economics. Let me give a few examples.

1. The speech calls for an ‘ecological civilisation’, drawing deeply on cultural assumptions concerning the harmony of nature as ‘shanshui’, ‘mountain-water’, but also modern Marxist approaches.

2. ‘Core socialist values’ is a key, stressing the fact that ethics is a crucial component of Chinese Marxism, which should permeate all levels of society even more.

3. Strengthening the mechanisms by which the people run the country, which means developing further a distinctly Marxist tradition of socialist democracy.

4. A ‘socialist rule of law’ (shehuizhuyi fazhi), in which everyone is subject to the law. Obviously, this has affinities with a European-derived ‘rule of law’, although that tradition really means a whole structure developed to buttress capitalism. This is why the speech emphasised a socialist rule of law. It is being developed as system to ensure the development of socialism, while at the same making it clear that no-one is above this law within this framework.

5. Bold innovation by artists, writers, journalists, philosophers, social scientists and scientists, so that they not only contribute decisively to the country but also to the world.

Apart from the details in the speech, one of the more fascinating aspects for me was that it followed in its structure a familiar pattern from the Marxist tradition. Look back at Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Deng and others, and you will find that important speeches like this begin with an assessment of achievements (this one since the eighteenth party congress five years ago). While it identifies significant achievements, it also stresses – in the tradition of ‘criticism and self-criticism’ – where problems have arisen. The next two parts deal with national and international concerns. Xi’s speech on this occasion focused more on internal concerns, which is to be expected. But he certainly did not neglect the international picture: the armed forces would continue to be modernised for the country’s own security in an international context and China would continue to pursue the peaceful policy of a ‘shared future for humanity’.

In all these speeches, the last part deals with the communist party itself. Xi’s tenure began with a strong desire by party leaders that he would deal with significant problems: corruption, factionalism, brewing coups, lack of unity, inadequate theoretical knowledge. On all fronts, Xi has driven through major reforms, so that his statements concerning the party’s ability to govern and lead, and the need for full, rigorous and strict governance over the party were certainly not empty phrases. More work obviously needs to be done, which he stressed, but the communist party has begun to emerge as stronger, more disciplined, unified and confident. It will be even more at the centre of power. As Xi put it, the ‘defining feature’ and ‘greatest strength’ of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the communist party. The party is the ‘highest force for political leadership’.

For some time now, Xi Jinping has been emphasising the ‘two centenary goals’ (2021 and 2049), the ‘Chinese dream’ and its concrete manifestation in global projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. These were in the speech as well, but with greater clarity. The first centenary goal – of the CPC itself – is still there, of building a xiaokang shehui, an old Confucian term infused with Marxist meaning and translated as ‘moderately prosperous society in all respects’. Given that this is around the corner, Xi’s sights are set further in the future. To achieve the second centenary goal, he laid out two steps.

2020-2035: Full ‘socialist modernisation [shehuizhuyi xiandaihua]’, or more fully a ‘socialistically modernised country’ [shehuizhuyi xiandaihua guojia]. This phrase captures all of the policies outlined in the speech, but it also marks a shift from his earlier pronouncements. He used to speak of socialist modernisation being achieved by the second centenary goal, marking 100 years since the establishment of the people’s republic. Now the aim has been brought forward to 2035.

2035-2050: building on the previous achievement and developing China into a ‘great modern socialist country’. This country will be strong, prosperous, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful. Only when this has been achieved can China begin moving beyond the ‘primary stage’ of socialism in which it still finds itself.

A tall and ambitious agenda indeed, but Xi and those around him as ‘the core’ have a reputation for getting things done. Crucial for understanding this revised plan is the observation, ‘based on a comprehensive analysis of the international and domestic environments’. Clearly, the rapidly shifting global situation, with the accelerating decline of the United States and ongoing turmoil and instability in Europe, along with world-shaping projects like the BRI and China’s increasing involvement around the world, the time has been judged right for the emergence of a ‘great modern socialist country’ by the middle of this century. It also means that China would become the most powerful country in the world, and thereby the most powerful socialist country in human history.

This is not to say that road ahead will be easy – far from it!

A crucial part of the speech identified a new primary contradiction: ‘What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’. This is straight out of the ‘contradiction analysis’ approach that Mao first elaborated in Yan’an in 1937, showing that Marxist dialectics in a Chinese frame is still front and centre of government policies. Not only is there a primary or most important contradiction in any situation, but this contradiction may shift in terms of the weight given to either side, or it may become secondary as a new primary contradiction emerges. Thus, the earlier primary contradiction, articulated by Deng Xiaoping, identified a tension between the people’s social and cultural needs and the backward economic forces. With China’s forty-year reform and opening-up, it has been decided – through careful analysis – that this earlier contradiction has become secondary.

But what does the new primary contradiction mean? Unbalanced and inadequate development signals the complex problems of world-leading development in the more eastern parts of China and the lag in western parts, with resultant gaps between rich and poor, city and countryside. Obviously, the new contradiction targets these issues more directly. And the people’s every growing need for a better life – an old Chinese term meihua shenghuo – applies to everyone, especially in western parts. Hence the targeted poverty alleviation program that has been accelerated, hence the BRI, hence the focus on the full range of what a ‘better life’ means. But the need for a better life also identifies with the core idea that socialism is primarily about improving the economic, social and cultural lives of everyone. Until this contradiction is resolved, China clearly remains in the primary stage of socialism.

At the same time, it signals a profoundly new era. This theme came through again and again in the report: China and its socialism have entered a new era. The trick here is to indicate profound continuity with the past, while also taking it all into a new stage. It is not for nothing that it has been called ‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era [xindedai zhongguotese shehuizhuyi sixiang]’.

Or ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ for short. Only Mao’s thought has until now been designated with the description sixiang, thought. Even Deng’s important but briefer reflections were designated only as lilun, theory. Xi Jinping Thought has now been written into the constitution of the Communist Party of China.

At one point, I woke in the middle of the night and realised that this moment, in October 2017, will turn out to be as significant at the moment in Yan’an some 80 years ago when Mao Zedong Thought was first formally identified.

I have spent some time with all of this, not least because foreign ‘China watchers’ have tended to focus on international relations, the strength of the communist party, and above all Xi’s own power. Obviously, this emphasis skews much of what the speech contained, both in terms of continuity with Xi’s earlier elaborations and the new directions. I leave aside the silly tropes of ‘jargon’, ‘coded’ language, or ‘grand theatre’ that are routinely trotted out.

But what was the response of people around China? I could mention the millions that watched the speech live, or the flurry of wechat and weibo posts about it. But one experience said it all for me. I decided to go to the local Xinhua bookshop, the official government one. At the front desk, I asked where Xi Jinping’s works were kept. The woman at the desk smiled and pointed upstairs.

There before me was a massive table laden with Xi Jinping’s publications. And at the forefront were various editions of the speech itself, only days after it was delivered. I struggled to find room to look at the publications, so crowded was the table. Eventually I managed to get hold of one copy, as well as a number of Xi’s other publications. For whatever reasons, people were snapping up the printed form of the speech. I simply could not imagine this happening anywhere else.

A tendency among some foreign Marxists visiting China

I have commented on this one from time to time before, but every now and then I encounter foreign Marxist who come to China with a preset idea of what socialism should be. Inevitably, China today does not fit the definition, so it cannot – they think – be socialist. This assumption also applies to pretty much any other place in the world that has had a socialist revolution.

But then a question arises? What do you make of some of the categories of Chinese Marxism: Marxist political economy as the guiding principle of economic planning; socialist core values; socialism with Chinese characteristics; socialist market economy; democratic centralism; democratic peoples dictatorship, and so on.

The response varies, but it turns on a distinction between being out of touch with reality or in touch with reality. If the first, then Chinese Marxists are deluded, since they cannot see what is really going on. But this approach really struggles to make sense of what they are actually doing. If the second – in touch with reality – then they must be hypocrites, or perhaps cynics who use Marxist language to say something else. It becomes a spinning of words with  a coded meaning or no meaning at all. Again, this is an impossible position, since the leaders, teachers, party members, students and common people are largely very serious about these terms – and they usually know what they mean.

Perhaps a better approach is take Chinese Marxism seriously and try to understand what it means.

Two further points. First, socialism is often expected to be perfect and ready made. The reality is that it is never perfect, for it is a work in progress. Second, we need to be aware of the many levels of socialism, whether social, economic, cultural, political and so on. These interwoven aspects move at different and uneven speeds, so that figuring out the complexity of a work in progress becomes even more difficult.

Losurdo’s new book on Western Marxism

Recently published is a new book by the stakhanovite, Domenico Losurdo, called: Western Marxism: How It Was Born, How It Died and How It Can Rise Again.


The brief description (found here) reads:

Western Marxism was afflicted by a sort of myopia: it didn’t realize that the wind of the revolution was blowing  from Russia to China and the Third World, joining with the national revolutions against Western imperialism.

There was a time when Marxism was an obligatory point of reference for any philosophical and political debate: those years saw the biggest victories for ‘Western Marxism’, which presented itself in stark contrast to its Eastern counterpart, accused of being a state ideology that propped up ‘Socialist’ regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia. Although at first the October revolution was viewed with hope, 20th century Communism contributed to the disintegration of the global colonial complex rather than creating a radically new social system. An extraordinary result that Western Marxism failed adequately to understand or appreciate. Hence its crisis and collapse. If it is to be revived, it must examine the anticolonial revolution and answer three key questions: What has the global anticolonial uprising meant in terms of freedom and emancipation? How is the clash between colonialism and anticolonialism played out today? What relationship was there between the anticolonial and anticapitalist struggles?

Losurdo puts these questions to the great authors of the 20th century – Bloch, Lukács, Adorno and Foucault – and of today – Agamben, Badiou and Žižek – in a heated debate that combines historical reconstruction and philosophical enquiry.

Exactly! For it was the Soviet Union that developed a thoroughly anti-colonial policy (arising from its ‘affirmation action’ nationalities policy). This policy enabled arms, personnel and know-how to support most of the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century as part of the global undermining of imperialist capitalism. Indeed, what is now called ‘post-colonialism’ could not have arisen – temporally and theoretically – without the anti-colonial theory and practice developed in the Soviet Union (especially by you-know-who).

Famine and Socialism

One of the great myths concerning socialist collectivisation of agriculture is that it produced ‘man-made’ famines, since it is supposedly less ‘efficient’. This story is perpetrated by friend and foe alike.

Example 1: The famine of 1932-33 in the Soviet Union, which is supposed to have been ‘man-made’.

Let me set the context. During the ‘socialist offensive’ of the late 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union, a massive process of industrialisation and collectivisation took place.

The Soviet Union did not have access to and did not want to use capitalist modes of accumulating funds, namely, colonial expansion (dispossession of others) and international loans. So the industrialisation process had to rely on internal, or socialist accumulation. In order to generate such accumulation, the government set higher prices for the increasing abundance of manufactured goods, as a type of super-tax that would flow back into industry. Meanwhile, prices on agricultural goods were set lower, albeit with fluctuations depending on seasonal shortages and in light of the constant efforts at speculation. This tensions of this ‘scissors’ method of generating revenue for further industrialisation generated obvious problems, but these were exacerbated by a famine in 1927-28, requiring enforced requisitions of grain in response to some peasants withholding agricultural produce for speculation (Withholding of grain for the sake of raising prices was an old practice, appearing not only during the NEP of the mid-1920s, but also much earlier). Obviously, something had to be done, since the ‘scissors’ method could not continue – it was always conceived as a temporary measure.

Another persistent problem was that traditional Russian farming methods were inadequate in light of new developments and a rising population. I mean not the subsistence survival agriculture practised in many parts of the world for millennia, but the practice of landlords extracting food necessary for survival by farmers. In fact, rural famines were endemic to Russian life. In more recent memory, famine hit in 1890-91, the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 had taken place in the context of widespread famine, which added to socio-economic chaos. Famines also blighted 1918-20 and were exacerbated during 1920-21.

So the process of collectivisation was at one level an effort to deal with endemic famine.

Many of course will point to the famine of 1932-33, with some even suggesting it was a deliberate policy of ‘genocide’ focused on the Ukraine (the ‘Holodomur’). But the famine also affected Northern Caucasus, Volga Region and Kazakhstan, the South Urals, and West Siberia. Enough research has been done to show that the famine was the result of significant weather conditions (drought), low harvest, international blockade, and the profound turmoil and frequent violence of the 1930s.

Were there famines later? Yes. One could argue that the food shortage during the siege of Leningrad was a famine, but the reasons are obvious here. And after the devastation of war and the effort to defeat Hitler, a famine took place after a drought in 1947. Most importantly, despite the drought cycle, no further famines were experienced.

Obviously, collectivisation had a distinct result in dealing with the endemic problem of famines. Why? Collectivisation enabled mechanisation and increase in the amount of land under cultivation, so much so that in 1932 many farmers worked harder to ensure greater crop yield and overcome the famine by the next year.

Example 2: The Chinese famine of 1959-61, during the ‘Great Leap Forward’, is also described as ‘man-made’, a result of the ‘foolhardy’ effort at collectivisation.

Once again, famine was endemic to Chinese agriculture (see Losurdo’s War and Revolution, pp. 271-72). Restricting ourselves to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, famines occurred in 1810-11, 1846, 1849, 1876-79 (9-13 million died), 1896-97, 1907, 1911, 1920-21 (again in northern China), 1928-30 (3 million people died), 1936 (5 million), 1940-41 (2-3 million). In famine was a persistent problem.

If we add the semi-colonisation of China, invasions, insurrections, along with droughts, the deaths in China between 1850 and 1950 were by far the highest in the world.

Again, something obviously had to be done. Having seen the long-term success of the collectivisation in the Soviet Union in overcoming the persistent cycle of famine, collectivisation was also undertaken in China.

The problem now was not only the devastation of decades of civil war and Japanese occupation, but a deliberate policy of economic warfare and strangulation by the Truman regime. This included schematic bombing from Taiwan of any industrial facilities built on the eastern seaboard. The deliberate aim was to keep the new communist country below subsistence level so as to produce a catastrophic economic situation, if not disaster and collapse.

We need to add Mao’s impatience. Seeing the dire situation of the country in light of economic devastation and US policy, he sought to leap over stages of development in order to escape from the desperate trap. Again, the US regimes made the most of situation, seeking to exacerbate the situation and cause widespread devastation. By the early 1960s, the Kennedy regime, looking back on the famine of 1959-61, gloated that they succeeded in retarding Chinese economic development by decades.

Were there famines after this time in China? Again, no. The long history of endemic famine and the tragic lesson of 1959-61 meant that China has managed to put famine behind it.

Early Thoughts Towards a Theory of the Socialist State

Is there a theory of the socialist state? We can draw together a theory from a careful study of the experiences and statements of the Soviet Union and China, the two places where a socialist state has begun to emerge. Why? They are the two largest countries where socialism has been and is in power, after a successful revolution. Let me put the proposal in a series of theses, premised on the point that a socialist state is not a federation, not a nation-state, not an empire, not a colonising power, whether externally or internally, but an entirely new state formation.

  1. A socialist state is based on the international category of class, which enables a new approach to the ‘national question’. Only through a resolute focus on class is the recognition of and equality between nationalities fully achieved. To be clear: by ‘national question’ I mean not the ‘nation’ as it is understood now (as an imagined community) but the question of nationalities (minzu), which should not be translated as ‘ethnic minorities’. In each state a number of nationalities exist together. One may approach such a reality either by prioritising ‘cultural-national’ factors (what may be called ‘culturism’) or by focusing resolutely on class. Only with class does one enable the dialectical position in which class unity produces not merely recognition and equality, but a whole new level of diversity. In other words, a socialist state enables a new approach to the dialectic of the universal and particular.
  2. This dialectic is embodied in the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants. This is a totalising unity based on class that produces new levels of diversity, and it requires a linking of liberation from class oppression with liberation from national oppression. When this link is made, the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes clear: it is the necessary foundation for the equality between and indeed diversity of peoples of different nations, after liberation has been achieved. The dictatorship of the proletariat does so by guaranteeing the rights of national minorities.
  3. A socialist state is the source and embodiment of what may be called affirmative action (polozhitel’naia deiatel’not’). This was first enacted in the Soviet Union on a vast scale and has been followed, with modifications, by all socialist states since – especially China. The program involves a comprehensive effort at social, cultural and economic recreation. Nationalities, no matter how small, are identified, named and established in territories, where local language, culture, education and governance are fostered. Dispersed minorities with no territory are provided with strong legal protections. I use the term ‘recreation’ quite deliberately, for it is very much a creative act entailing the creation of groups, peoples and nations – to the point of creating new nationalities out of groups that had never dreamed of such an existence. The process involves the deliberate intervention by socialists into the process of producing and developing a new society, among which national groups play a central role.
  4. A socialist state undertakes cultural revolution. By this I mean the raising of the many people of the state to a new socialist level. In the Soviet Union ‘cultural revolution’ meant ‘the cultural development of the working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the ability to take part in the administration of the country’. In China, we need to reclaim the meaning of cultural revolution in this sense, and not in terms of the period of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, cultural revolution means Marxism’s influence on and infiltration into social and cultural assumptions. This is increasingly clear in China, where Marxism is becoming a cultural force, indeed a part of the long history of Chinese culture.
  5. A socialist state is anti-colonial. This crucial insight first appeared in the Soviet Union: the October Revolution and the affirmative action program of the Soviet Union functioned as a microcosm of the global struggle against colonialism. This insight is a logical extension of the argument I noted earlier, in which a focus on class provides a distinct, dialectical, approach to the national question that leads to the world’s first affirmative action program. Once this logic is applied to national minorities, it also may be applied to gender, religion, and then anti-colonial struggles. The logic is clear: socialism has led to a new approach to nationalities, liberating them and fostering them through the affirmative action program; further, socialism is opposed on a global scale to capitalist imperialism; therefore, global socialism engages in and fosters anti-colonial struggles throughout the world. No wonder the Soviet Union actively supported anti-colonial struggles around the world, so much so that what we call post-colonialism, as both an era and a theory, could not have happened without such anti-colonial action. This also applies to China, whose socialist revolution was also an anti-colonial revolution, finally throwing off European semi-colonialism (which dated from the nineteenth century) and Japanese colonialism. China’s involvement today in formerly colonised countries in the world is a continuation of this anti-colonial policy by the most powerful socialist state in history.
  6. A socialist state must deal with counter-revolutionary forces within and especially international efforts to undermine it (the two are often connected). Whenever a socialist revolution happens, we do not find international capitalist countries saying, ‘Wonderful! Go ahead, construct your socialist country. We will leave you in peace; indeed, we are enthusiastic bystanders’. Instead, historical reality reveals consistent efforts to undermine and overthrow socialist states, including the fostering of counter-revolutionary forces within. We need only recall the ‘civil’ wars in Russia and China, the international blockades, sabotage, efforts at destabilisation in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and the international pastime – found even among international Marxists – of ‘China bashing’.
  7. The communist party is integral to a socialist state. This is a relationship of transcendence and immanence: the party arises from and expresses the will of the masses of workers, farmers and intellectuals, while it also directs the masses. From the masses, to the masses – as Mao Zedong stated. If the relationship is broken, the party loses its legitimacy and the project is over. Thus, the party undergoes constant renewal and reform in order to maintain legitimacy. If a communist party accedes to a bourgeois or liberal democratic system, it is soon out of power, for bourgeois democracy is one of the most effective weapons against socialism.
  8. A socialist state develops socialist democracy. Integral to socialist democracy is the communist party in terms of transcendence and immanence in relation to the masses. In contrast to Greek democracy, liberal (or bourgeois) or illiberal democracy, socialist democracy includes the majority of the population – workers, peasants and intellectuals. Socialist democracy is a constantly evolving process and may, as Mao Zedong pointed out, include – among others – stages of new democracy, democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism. The latter is the reality in China today.
  9. Does a form of socialist civil society develop under socialism in power? This question remains unclear. On the one hand, it is clear that ‘civil’ society, which was originally called ‘bourgeois society’ develops only with the bourgeois state – as Marx and Engels indicate. It entails a separation between state and society, with the bourgeoisie arising in the towns and eventually reshaping the whole nature of the state. Historical experience of socialist states indicates that what may very loosely be called a socialist middle class does not appear in this fashion. Instead, it is the result of systemic poverty alleviation, as we see in China today. They are the product of socialism in power and do not arise in opposition to it. It follows that ‘civil’ society as so far understood does not function in this environment. On the other hand, it may be that a socialist form of civil society arises, although we need to be wary of using such a term. Perhaps it is the conrete expression of Lenin’s approach to freedom. This freedom is a freedom from bourgeois civil society and freedom for the socialist project. Eventually, the category of freedom itself will become an everyday habit.

A final question: will the socialist state ‘wither away’, as some elements of the Marxist tradition suggest? Perhaps, but only in a future situation in which the majority of countries are socialist. However, even in this situation is more realistic to see that the socialist state will take on new features so that it becomes a communist state.

Discarding ten biases against China

I rather like this article, even though it uses the problematic term ‘West’. The original article can be found at thew CPC’s flagship newspaper, The People’s Daily. I would also mention the Taiping Revolution, in terms of religiously inspired revolutions, in relation to point 7, although this was in many respects the precursor to the communist revolution of the twentieth century.

BEIJING, March 5 (Xinhua) — China’s ongoing annual political high season has provided a key window through which observers can better understand China’s development and its outlook.

However, if the nation and the annual two-week events are still viewed with rigid impressions offered by the West, then conclusions drawn are likely to be defective.

Observers should avoid a series of biases seen in the past if they seek true objectivity when understanding China today.


The essence of democracy is to be responsible for the people.

In some nations, the checks and balances of power have resulted in a political stalemate in which bitterness between parties has worsened and opposition is raised simply to disagree, rather than to discuss.

They have also seen a handful of families and hidden interests exercising influence on elections via their wealth. This kind of democracy can hardly lead to the sound governance badly needed by the people, though it may look “beautiful.”

From a realistic perspective, China’s democratic decision-making has displayed relatively high quality and efficiency.

As a multi-ethnic nation with a large population and territory, China values reaching consensus through broad consultation before taking measures.

The formulation of the 13th five-year plan for the national economy and social development is exemplary of this effort.

It took about nine months for a team formed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to draft the plan’s proposal, which marks priorities for national development from 2016 to 2020.

During the period, which started in January 2015, the team solicited and analyzed opinions from all walks of life and tried to include as many opinions as possible.

The proposal guided the creation of the 13th five-year plan. A draft of the plan was produced later after rounds of top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top consultation that covered all aspects of the society.

The draft plan will be submitted to the National People’s Congress (NPC) for review during its ongoing annual session.

Once adopted, the propositions of the CPC will be elevated as the nation’s will and implemented across the country.

Scientific and effective decision-making and implementation is a huge advantage forChina’s democratic system.

Currently, China is focusing on realizing the goal of finishing building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, which is the people’s biggest concern. One objective is tolift more than 70 million people out of poverty by the end of 2020, a number bigger thanthe population of either Britain or France. This goal not only conforms to the fundamental and long-term interests of the people but also safeguards human rights.


Historically, corruption is not the result of a political system, but is related to phases of economic development. In the process of industrialization, the Western nations all witnessed spreading corruption due to fast accumulation of wealth and lack of supervision. Sure, there are problems with the CPC, which boasts more than 87 million members. Fortunately, it has been increasingly aware of the fact that if the violators are not punished, then it is offending the 1.3 billion population. Therefore, the CPC is highlighting the governing of Party members strictly.

Over the past three years, investigations into violators including Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua have demonstrated the CPC’s determination to take a zero-tolerance stance against corruption.

China has also been carrying out cooperation with the international community to facilitate repatriation of corrupt fugitives, leaving no haven for those hoping to escape punishment.

The CPC’s campaign against corruption is gaining ground, which not only enhanced the Party’s soft power, but also offered experience for the international community to jointly stem corruption.


It is true that China is continuously facing problems and challenges in its development,but the cliche prediction of a “coming collapse in China” made by speculators overseas has never come.

It seems unlikely such rhetoric will end this year however.

Over the 30-plus years since China’s reform and opening up, every five-year development plan has been perfectly fulfilled. This is thanks to China choosing realistic development paths, which relies on the CPC’s strong governance capability.

China’s economic fundamentals remain sound and steady and the economy stays within a reasonable level. The political and social conditions are stable as well.

The CPC has put forward the five development concepts of innovation, coordination, green development, opening up and sharing and the “Four Comprehensives” strategy keeps making progress, facts that ensure the constant unleashing of benefits from the country’s reforms.


This argument ignores the opportunities brought about by China’s economic scale and potential.

China is the world’s second largest economy, and a 6.5 percent growth is a huge propeller for the world’s economy, whereas the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) in its Interim Economic Outlook Forecasts put the growth rate of the United States at 2 percent this year and 2.2 percent for next year. The growth of Japanthis year and next is expected to be 0.8 percent and 0.6 percent respectively.

In China, however, despite a slowing growth in some better-developed coastal areas, the development room for many inland regions remains broad.

China’s drive to solve the economic imbalance among different regions provides huge potential for future economic development. Besides, China is encouraging and stimulating new dynamics with a new round of high-level opening-up, offering greater opportunities for investors all around the world.

Many observers also believe that the current slowing growth signals an increasingly mature Chinese economy, a “new normal” situation that should be adapted to by both China and the world. They believe China will continue to be a major “engine” for the world economy.


To help better understand China’s military spending, it may be advisable to first listen to U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent State of the Union address. “We spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the finest fighting force in the history of the world,” the U.S. president said. “No nation attacks us directly, or our allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin.”

On the contrary, China’s military expenditure has long been at a low level, putting the building of national defense under great pressure. The current defense spending rise reveals tremendous restraint by China.

The blame by some major countries on China is, no doubt, out of ulterior motives.

China implements an active defense military strategy. It will never attack others unless being attacked first and it will not waive the power to strike back if it is under attack from others.

The peaceful development of China has significantly reduced the risk of a world war.


In a sense, many localities in China are turning into “cities of immigrants” where more foreigners are investing and living in. Chinese people always welcome them, despite the fact that Chinese have suffered century-long humiliation inflicted by foreign aggressors since the outbreak of the Opium War in mid-19th century till the founding of the New China.

Today, the comprehensive strength of the country has become increasingly stronger and the national pride and cohesion are also rising.

However, Chinese people are keeping a sober mind and understand that patriotism should be expressed in a rational, peaceful and inclusive manner and they are making their patriotism a motive to work hard and seek peaceful development.

China will never allow the emergence of any extreme nationalism, knowing that such mentality will put the nation in peril. It is incompatible with the CPC’s peaceful ideology.

Moreover, the inclusive trait in Chinese culture is a powerful antidote to the parochial nationalism.


People holding this view should visit China to see the fervor during Christmas or observe the devout prayers at mosques. If the government had really oppressed religions, such scenes could never occur.

The Chinese government’s respect for religious freedom lies, to a great extent, in this country’s profound culture and traditions. Historically, hostility between different religions hardly existed in China, not to mention a religious war. Such respect is also stipulated in the law to protect people’s religious freedom.

According to international consensus, the choice of whether to worship and what to worship adheres to a country’s law. If an individual commits crime or conducts terrorist activities in the name of religion, they must be handled in accordance with the law.


China has more than 600 million Internet users, the most in the world, and has fostered such Internet giants as Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent.

If one understands Chinese and lives in China, he or she will find diversified topics on Chinese websites and heated online discussion. As a political stage that welcomes overseas media, the ongoing annual sessions of the country’s national legislature and political advisory body have also drawn a huge amount opinions and suggestions from Internet users.

As a sovereignty, China doesn’t allow the Internet to be outside the law. Overseas Internet companies are only permitted to enter the Chinese market if they obey Chinese laws. The Chinese government has tightened management on illegal remarks posted on the Internet and it won’t tolerate the West using the Internet to set agendas to interfere in China’s economic and social development.

Many countries have laws to manage the Internet and China will improve its network management.


Islands in the South China Sea were first discovered, named and used by the Chinese, and China was the first and continues to exercise sovereignty over these islands.

As a matter of fact, peace, security and stability are the common wishes for all countries in the region. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are actively and steadily pushing forward consultations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea under the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

Since the United States presented its Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy, the region that had been generally peaceful for many years has fallen into tumult. U.S. aircraft and ships have perennially conducted surveillance on countries in the region with increasing frequency, escalating regional tension. This is the greatest danger for “militarization” in the South China Sea.

China has never held back freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Ironically, the United States urged China to obey the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the United States itself is unwilling to accede into.


The Belt and Road Initiative doesn’t solely belong to China. It rather belongs to the whole world.

Without exclusivity, the initiative is a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk Road routes and radiating across the oceans to America. Any interested country or region can join the network.

China’s efforts to push forward progress for the Belt and Road Initiative, set up Silk Road Fund and call for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have received positive responses from many countries. Future cooperation will be conducted under the principle of joint consultation, construction and benefits so as to realize common development and prosperity.

Kim Il Sung’s assessment of 1989 in Eastern Europe

As part of my bed-time reading, I continue with Anecdotes of Kim Il Sung’s Life. Towards the end of the second volume is his assessment as to why the communist governments in Eastern Europe were overthrown by coups.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an abnormal event took place in the world: Socialism collapsed and capitalism was restored in a number of countries.

The renegades of socialism, who had destroyed socialism, tried to justify their despicable betrayal, claiming that the ideals of socialism itself were wrong.

On the other hand, the imperialists asserted that the socialist system was in itself problematic, talking about the ‘bankruptcy of the socialist system,’, with regard to the collapse of socialism in those countries.

This caused ideological confusion among many people.

Are the ideals of socialism and the socialist system wrong?

A stream of foreigners came to Pyongyang to find an answer to this question.

Among them was the chair of the Worker’s Communist Party of Sweden.

On June 29, 1992, Kim Il Sung met him, and explained the cause of the collapse of the Eastern European socialist countries.

He said it could be explained in two ways: the first was that the leaders of those countries took to sycophancy and the worship of great power.

He continued: ‘In the past the East European socialist countries used to do everything the way the Soviet Union did; for example, if the Soviet Union uttered “A”, they said “A”, and if the former pronounced “B”, they said “B”‘.

He cited an example at this: the people of the former German Democratic Republic were said to have remarked that when it was raining in Moscow Berliners used to take an umbrella with them, although it wasn’t raining in their city. In this way Germans criticised the sycophantic attitude of their Party leadership towards the big power.

Secondly, the ruin of the East European socialist countries was due to the fact that the leaders of those countries were grossly bureaucratic.

He said: ‘In capitalist society, where state officials and economic officials are separated from each other, even if the ruling officials act bureaucratically and administer state affairs unskilfully, businessmen can still make money without much interference. In socialist society, however, the situation is different; in socialist society the masses of the people are the masters of state power and the means of production. Leading officials must therefore always go among the masses to learn about their demands and manage the state and economy to meet their will and demands; however, the leaders of the East European socialist countries failed to mix intimately with the masses; instead, they administered state affairs by looking up at the ceiling of their office or asking Moscow what to do. When their subjective opinion was not in accordance with the will of the masses or the reality was not accepted readily by people, they would enforce it in a bureaucratic manner. Consequently, they became alienated from the people and ultimately produced the serious outcome of destroying socialism’.

He continued: ‘It was because of such mistakes as the sycophantic attitude to the great power and a bureaucratic manner that socialism has collapsed in the former East European socialist countries; it was never because the socialist system is in itself problematic’.

After listening to the explanation, the guest from Northern Europe said confidently: ‘It was indeed the right option for me to travel a long way to see you’.