Different ways to interpret the Marxist tradition

In recent discussion in China, I have become more aware of different ways the Marxist tradition can be interpreted. You can take any core feature, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the withering away of the state, the distinction between socialism and communism, the nature of the socialist state, and many more.

For example, Marx uses the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 11 times, where he means a coercive force of the state that crushes class opponents. This is in tension with his treatments of the Paris commune, where he praises the diminishment of state power and its continuance only as apparatus. Engels, by contrast, does not use dictatorship of the proletariat, but coins the phrase (only in 1894), the dying or ‘withering away of the state’. Lenin develops the argument further, distinguishing between two phases, the dictatorship of the proletariat and then the state’s withering. He pushes this into a distant future, but Stalin argues that it would take place only after global communism had been achieved and communism had become second nature – which may take 1000 years or more. And in Chinese Marxism, dictatorship of the proletariat becomes ‘democratic dictatorship’ in Mao’s hands and then ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ with Deng Xiaoping, now as an inclusive category operating in terms of non-antagonistic contradictions.

What about socialism and communism? This distinction is not in Marx and Engels. Only in the late notes, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’, does Marx distinguish an initial stage of communism and a further stage. He leaves open the possibility of more. Lenin then distinguishes these as socialism and communism, with socialism still bearing many features, such as state, classes, law and so on. Only with communism will the earlier prescriptions of Marxism begin to appear. Stalin takes this further, pushing communism into a very distant future, while socialism has a strong multi-national state, tensions between forces and relations of production continue, people are rewarded according to work, equalisation (a petty-bourgeois idea) has no place, and the state’s domestic responsibilities, affirmative action and fostering of anti-colonial struggles play huge roles. In a Chinese situation, they take an even longer view, with the preliminary stage of socialism lasting 100 years, after which a next stage emerges, the moderately prosperous, peaceful and stable society. During this process, a whole spate of new approaches emerge.

How do we interpret these developments? Here are some possibilities:

  1. A narrative of betrayal. Engels betrays Marx; Lenin betrays Marx and Engels; Stalin betrays all of the former; Mao betrays them; Deng betrays Mao … Pick your place, but betrayal of Marxism happens at some point. I find this approach quite common among ‘western’ Marxists.
  2. Continuity, sometimes radical. A smaller number take this line, arguing that all of the ideas found in Stalin, Mao or Deng have precursors in the Marxist tradition.
  3. Clarification. Each stage of the tradition and each of its different branches constitutes a clarification of some idea or practice that was not so clear before. This is a more common Chinese approach.
  4. Changing historical circumstances, which may be connected with the first or third approach. Obviously, specific circumstances, cultural histories, political realities and so on produce new problems, which require new solutions. This is what the Chinese call ‘seeking truth from facts’ (drawn from Mao).
  5. The differences between socialism seeking power and socialism in power. As Lenin and Mao pointed out repeatedly, winning a revolution is relatively easy; infinitely more complex is the effort to construct socialism. This is obviously connected with the fourth point, but plays a crucial role.

The autocracy of (biblical) interpretation

I hear this one in myriad variations:

‘Badiou’s use of Paul is merely as an example of his preconceived system’.

‘Does Negri need Job? No’.

‘Those Americans are not really exegetes’. (They are probably not many things, but exegetes?)

‘Is that really what Calvin is saying or is that you?’

And perhaps the best of all: ‘Do you need Ezekiel?’

On the surface they may sound innocent enough: we need to read carefully and attentively, exegeting the text for its true meaning. But beneath that are deeply held theological and autocratic assumptions. Earlier I had a dig at the theological side of things, but let’s look at the autocratic assumptions. The text and ultimately the author is the autocrat with the supreme authority; the task of scholars is to discern the autocrat’s meaning and will; in doing so, leave all of your petty preconceptions at the palace door. Here too theology is not far away, for autocracy traditionally argues: one God in heaven, one ruler as his representative on earth. Of course, the problem is which autocrat do we mean? During the period of absolute monarchies, myriad rulers – Russian, Prussian, Danish, papal … – claimed to be God’s sole representative. The implications for texts should be obvious.



On Interpretation, or whether Tolkien’s opinion of his own work counts for anything

My post a couple of days ago concerning Milbank and Tolkien, along with Heinlein and the Church of All Worlds, soon degenerated into a discussion about the validity or otherwise of Tolkien’s own opinions about his works. Loren Rossen objected to my characterisation of Lord of the Rings as an interminably boring allegory with unsympathetic characters by resorting to what Tolkien himself said about his work. In particular, Rossen and others are keen to deflect the criticism that there is a strong smell of proto-fascilism in LOTR.

A few thoughts in response. To begin with, we need to separate what an author believes and what he or she may write as literary works. The two are not coterminous. Tolkien may have expressed his dislike of the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s, but we should not confuse those opinions with a product like LOTR. In light of that distinction, it is perfectly possible that Tolkien may have given voice to proto-fascist ideals – blood and soil, authentic and indigenous traditions, nascent racism and so on – despite his own apparent intentions. It’s an old, old point, but to focus on an author’s intention is terribly reductionist (and I would add, deeply theological). Intention is one small aspect of interpretation, playing a minor role, and certainly should not be permitted to usurp a dominant place. Now, let’s make this a little more complex. Even if we stay with intention, one’s intentions are never entirely rational, clearly articulated or conscious. Tolkien may have thought he was expressing values like courage, faithfulness and goodness, but in doing so he gave off all manner of subconscious signals concerning class, gender, politics and so on – all of which becomes a lovely warring mess. Add the fact that autobiography is the highest form of fiction and we really can’t trust anything Tolkien says about his work, especially when that becomes an effort to control interpretation.  Perhaps the best response is a story about T.S. Eliot that goes something like this: when he was asked, ‘What is The Waste Land about?’ he replied ‘The Waste Land’.